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THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVATE SECTOR
UNIONISM: WHAT NEXT FOR THE NLRA?
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH * AND BARRY T. HIRSCH **
ABSTRACT
In this Article, we ask whether the National Labor Relations Act,
enacted over seventy years ago, can remain relevant in a competitive
economy where nonunion employer discretion is the dominant form of
workplace governance. The best opportunity for the NLRA’s continued
relevance is the modification of its language and interpretation to enhance worker voice and participation in the nonunion private sector
without imposing undue costs on employers. Examples of such reforms include narrowing the NLRA’s company union prohibition, implementing a conditional deregulation system that relies on consent
by an independent employee association, changing the labor law default to some form of a nonunion work group, expanding state and local authority over labor relations, and encouraging NLRA protection
for employee use of employer-owned Internet services. These legal innovations have the potential to be welfare-enhancing, as compared to
outcomes likely to evolve under the current legal framework. Although
the political likelihood of such changes is currently low, steps in this
direction could result in an increased relevance for the NLRA in the
modern economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 1 provided the
legal framework that ushered in union organizing, collective bargaining, and a sharp rise in private sector unionism in the United States
during the early and mid-twentieth century. Since that time, the role
and relevance of the NLRA has narrowed as private sector union
density has eroded. 2 In today’s competitive environment, the dominant form of workplace governance lacks the presence of a union; it is
a governance structure under which management has unilateral, albeit constrained, discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace. This dominance is so complete that reforms in the NLRA cannot restore traditional unionism to its previous level. Designed for a
different era and type of workplace, the NLRA’s 1930s vision of bargaining relationships has limited relevance today. One result of this
transformation is an unmet desire of many nonunion workers for opportunities to express individual and collective voice in cooperation
with their employers, albeit in a form different from what exists in
most traditional union establishments.
This Article explores changes in labor law and public policy that
might satisfy this unmet desire by promoting welfare-enhancing
worker voice, participation, and cooperation in the United States labor market, in particular for nonunion, private sector workers.3 Underlying this assessment of possible regulatory change is the reality
that in today’s competitive environment, the dominant form of employee governance is one in which management has unilateral discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace environment, constrained by societal norms, employment regulations, and the need for
employers to attract and retain capable employees. This reality is reflected in the declining fortunes of traditional private sector unionism—a decline that does not look to be reversed in today’s increasingly competitive economic environment.
Most labor reforms, including some discussed here, were originally proposed with the intent of either encouraging or discouraging
traditional unionism. Our concern, however, is not with the promotion of an arguably outdated model of collective representation.
Rather, our analysis recognizes that traditional unionism will remain
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
2. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1527-28 (2002); infra Part II.A.
3. Major themes in this Article were previously outlined in a brief proceedings paper.
Barry T. Hirsch & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The NLRA After Seventy Years: What Next?, 58 PROC.
LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 133 (2006).
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a small part of the economy’s private sector and focuses on reforms
that, given this fact, are welfare-enhancing for society as a whole.
The focus of this Article’s proposals, therefore, is to facilitate welfareenhancing employee voice and participation in an economy where few
private sector employees will be represented by traditional unions.
We use the term “welfare-enhancing” to indicate that the societal
benefits from a change exceed its costs, with benefits and costs interpreted broadly to include nonmonetary as well as monetary effects.
Of course, reliable estimation of the benefits and costs associated
with labor regulations is exceedingly difficult. 4 Therefore, although
we cannot state with certainty that our proposals would be successful, they represent promising opportunities to enhance overall welfare by expanding worker voice and cooperation without imposing
undue costs on—and perhaps providing benefits to—employers.
The need for welfare-enhancing labor reform is well-illustrated by
the contrast between the NLRA’s policies and antiquated view of the
workplace and the workplace as it currently exists. The original version of the NLRA was enacted in 1935 and is popularly known as the
Wagner Act. A key goal of the Wagner Act was to promote national
commerce, which had faced major disruptions due to labor unrest, 5
by “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment.” 6 The Wagner Act’s endorsement of collective action 7 was tempered by the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments to the
NLRA in 1947. Although not mutually exclusive with the purposes of
the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments emphasized, among
other things, the goal of protecting employee free choice—specifically
the choice not to seek collective representation.8 The resulting NLRA,

4. See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment
Regulation: What Are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 125, 134-38 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) (outlining “the methodological
framework by which employment regulations are assessed”).
5. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive
World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 602-05 (2007).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
7. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1449 (1993) (stating that “the primary objective of the Wagner Act was to achieve workers’ ‘substantive freedom’ ”
through “the facilitation of collective action in the labor market in order to enhance
workers’ bargaining power”).
8. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 229 (1990); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1534. The unmistakable concern of
proponents of the amendments was to assist the ability of employees to choose not to have
collective representation, in large part to combat what proponents viewed as abuses by unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (stating in preamble that “[e]xperience has further demonstrated
that certain practices by some labor organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary ef-
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therefore, has a strong aim to promote and protect the ability of employees to freely choose whether or not to engage in collective action
or representation. This policy goal is not limited to choices about traditional unionism, however. Collective action may take many forms,
and employees’ freedom to choose unconventional means to exercise
their collective rights is firmly within the protection of the NLRA.9
The NLRA’s statutory language is vague enough to protect, at
least theoretically, ever-changing forms of collective action—even
forms found in a modern workplace that is vastly different from what
existed in 1935. Many manufacturing jobs have been replaced by positions that stress service or intellectual skills. 10 The strict hierarchy
that once existed in most workplaces has eroded as many businesses
seek flexibility, information sharing, and more decentralized management. 11 Although the broad scope of the NLRA’s language is generally capable of taking these changes into account, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), the agency that enforces the
NLRA, has been surprisingly reluctant to support these changes.
Some of the NLRA’s provisions are beyond the Board’s control, however, and several have become obsolete or even detrimental in the
contemporary economy. 12 Thus, both flexible enforcement and statutory changes in the NLRA are warranted.
Part II of this Article examines the rise and fall of private sector
unionism in the U.S. and addresses the reasons that managerial discretion, rather than union-negotiated agreements, has emerged as
the dominant form of workplace governance. Part III explores private
sector workers’ desire for more voice and cooperation in the workplace and describes ways in which that desire may be satisfied. Finally, Part IV evaluates several labor regulatory changes that may be
welfare-enhancing, providing greater opportunities for employee
voice and participation while being economically sustainable in a
competitive economic environment.
fect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . through strikes and other forms of industrial
unrest or through concerted activities”).
9. See infra note 209.
10. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 5, 125 (2004); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1536
(citing Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?,
in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 164 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos
eds., 1992)).
11. See DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND
EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 2-8 (1995) (providing brief history and usage data on employeeinvolvement plans); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium:
Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1651, 1652-53, 1663-66 (1999).
12. One example, as discussed in detail below, is the NLRA’s ban on company unions.
The broad definition of “labor organization,” working in tandem with that ban, reveals a
need for modification of the statute. See infra Part IV.A.
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II. IS THE NLRA RELEVANT IN TODAY’S WORKPLACE?
A. Private Sector Unionism in Decline
It is undisputed that unionism in the private sector has long been
in decline. Private sector “union density” 13 was about one-in-three
workers in the early 1950s, falling to nearly one-in-five workers by
the end of the 1970s. 14 Although the number of private sector workers climbed from 66.1 million to 107.8 million workers between 1977
and 2006, union membership declined from 14.34 million to 7.98 million. 15 This translates into a union membership density decrease
from 21.7% (or 23.3% covered by a collective-bargaining agreement)
in 1977 to only 7.4% (8.1% covered) in 2006. 16 Particularly sharp declines occurred in sectors highly organized in the past. Between 1977
and 2006, membership density fell from 35.5% (37.6% covered) to
11.7% (12.5% covered) in manufacturing and from 35.9% (37.6%
covered) to 13.0% (13.6% covered) in construction. 17 It is difficult
to identify large industries in which private sector union density
has not diminished.
Nor has private sector unionization ended its decline. Union density is affected by “flows” in and out of union and nonunion employment stocks. In any given year, large numbers of union and nonunion
jobs are lost and large numbers of mostly nonunion jobs are created.
For membership to remain constant, union organizing of existing and
new nonunion workplaces, plus employment gains in alreadyunionized workplaces, must equal the number of union jobs lost. For

13. Union density is defined here as the percentage of wage and salary workers who
are members of a union or, where indicated, covered by a union-negotiated collectivebargaining agreement.
14. Union density among private sector workers, based on a compilation of figures reported by labor unions to the federal government, is estimated to have peaked at 35.7% in
1953 and fallen to 22.0% in 1979. See LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION
SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY A-1, A-2 (1985).
15. See Union Membership and Coverage Database, http://www.unionstats.com (last
visited Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Union Membership] (compiling data since 1973 from the
Current Population Survey (CPS), the monthly household survey conducted jointly by the
Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as described in Barry T.
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003)). The CPS adopted
the currently used union status questions in 1977, hence the choice of years in the text.
16. See id.
17. See id. In contrast to the private sector, public sector union density rose sharply
during the 1960s and 1970s and has held relatively steady since the early 1980s. Public
sector membership density rose from 32.8% (40.1% covered) to 36.2% (40.1% covered) between 1977 and 2006. Id. Whereas 25.8% of all union members were public sector workers
in 1977 (and 28.4% public among all covered workers), 48.0% of union members were government workers in 2006 (48.5% among covered). Id. Among 7.38 million union members
employed in the public sector in 2006, 62% worked in local government, 25% in state government, and 13% in federal government. Id. The federal government figure of 13% consists of union densities of 6.9% for postal employees and 6.1% for nonpostal employees. Id.

1138

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1133

density to remain constant in an economy with a growing labor force,
the flow into membership must exceed the number of union jobs lost.
Organizing since the early 1980s has fallen well short of the conditions to hold density constant; thus, the steady-state private sector
density is likely to be below its current level of 7.4%.18
The reasons for declining unionism are many and well known.
Important, but hardly sufficient, are structural changes that have
reallocated jobs toward industries, occupations, and locations that
are typically less unionized. A significant factor leading to these
changes has been technological advances that reduce the need for labor in production jobs and in occupations where job tasks are routinized and programmable (for example, newspaper typesetters in an
earlier era and travel agents today). 19 This rapid productivity growth
has been particularly evident in manufacturing, where increasing
output has been accompanied by lower employment. 20 Moreover, the
NLRA organizing process has proven costly and difficult for unions,
due in no small part to often fierce management opposition. 21 Such
resistance reflects, more fundamentally, an increasingly competitive
domestic and international economy 22 coupled with union wage premiums that have shown surprisingly modest declines. 23
18. See Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the
Private Sector, 1973-1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 28, 52-54 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002).
19. See David H. Autor et al., The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An
Empirical Exploration, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1279, 1279-86 (2003).
20. Manufacturing employment declined from approximately 20 million workers in
1977 to 15.6 million workers in 2006; because of the growth in overall employment during
that time period, manufacturing employment declined from 30.3% of the private sector
workforce in 1977 to 14.5% in 2006. See Union Membership, supra note 15; see also STONE,
supra note 10, at 197 (arguing that decline in manufacturing unionism has allowed employers to restructure work practices in ways that make organizing more difficult, such as
increased use of technology).
21. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 116 (1999) (describing survey results showing that a majority of managers would oppose union organizing).
Similarly, Cynthia Estlund has argued that the NLRA’s isolation from any significant revisions or other forms of innovation—which she describes as its “ossification”—has
contributed to the NLRA’s ineffectuality and the decline of unionism. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1530-32; see also STONE, supra note 10, at 125 (stating that the NLRB’s
organizing rules, such as bargaining unit determinations, are often incompatible with
the modern workplace).
22. Indeed, Michael Wachter sees a single, overarching reason for union decline, arguing that the NLRA did not incorporate the corporatist outlook of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was overturned by the Supreme Court in its 1935 decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and that over
time, the competitive U.S. economy made unionism a niche workplace institution in the
private sector. See Wachter, supra note 5, at 584-85, 588-90, 598, 606-07, 613.
23. Wage premiums refer to differences between union wages and the wages of nonunion workers with similar skills in similar jobs; wage premiums in the U.S. are larger
than in most other developed countries. See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson,
Changes over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects in the UK and the US Revisited, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 197, 207-21 (John T. Addison & Claus
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Sentiment for unions by workers, the public, and employers is the
ultimate constraint in this highly competitive world, limiting not only
the ability to organize but also adoption of union-friendly public policy and workplace norms. 24 Sentiment for unions may have been
dampened by government mandates and regulations that affect all
workplaces; such legislation may act more as a substitute than a
complement for collective bargaining. 25 Changes in the interpretation
and enforcement of the NLRA since the 1980s—when Republican
administrations led to an NLRB less supportive of union organizing—have not enhanced organizing but can explain little of the decline. Private-sector union density decreased throughout the Clinton
years and its more labor-friendly NLRB. 26
Absent a sharp and unlikely shift by workers and voters from individualistic to collectivist attitudes 27 or a more broad shift in U.S.
economic policy from a competitive to a corporatist orientation, 28 a
Schnabel eds., 2003) (summarizing international evidence and concluding that there has
been only a weak downward trend in the U.S. union wage premium); see also Barry T.
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK:
COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 19-26, tbls.2a-c (2007) (providing
time-consistent regression estimates of union wage premiums for the years 1973-2006).
24. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Union Tries to Unite Blacks, Latinos: Workers at Meatpacking Plant Must First Overcome Distrust, WASH. POST, July 24, 2006, at A4 (noting resistance of some workers to unionization, including one employee’s comment that “ ‘[a] union speaks on your behalf . . . . I can speak for myself’ ”). Distrust of traditional unions is
common among professional and technical workers who often identify with management.
See Richard W. Hurd & John Bunge, Unionization of Professional and Technical Workers:
The Labor Market and Institutional Transformation, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 179, 186-90 (Richard B. Freeman et al.
eds., 2005) (describing their survey of professional and technical workers, which revealed
desire for greater voice and participation in decision-making, but aversion to the type
of adversarial relationship often seen in unionized workplaces). Worker sentiment toward organizing is also less favorable in geographic areas where unionization has
been low in the past. See Thomas J. Holmes, Geographic Spillover of Unionism 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12025, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12025 (showing that unionism is “contagious,” spilling
out of long-ago unionized coal mines and steel mills into newly established supermarkets
and hospitals).
25. See George R. Neumann & Ellen R. Rissman, Where Have All the Union Members
Gone?, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 175, 175-77 (1984) (estimating frequently espoused, but rarely
tested, thesis that governmental protections for workers have led to lower union density
and finding time-series and cross-section evidence consistent with thesis).
26. See Union Membership, supra note 15. Private sector union density decreased
from 11.4% in 1993 to 9% in 2001. Id.
27. Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, 278-87 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that increases in union density have occurred in spurts following shifts in worker and public attitudes toward collective action).
28. Corporatist governance emphasizes cooperation among groups and cooperation
between the state and certain powerful groups, such as national unions. See Wachter, supra note 5, at 589-90. In the labor context, “[c]orporatism views free competition as a destructive force that has to be both controlled and channeled through institutions that practice fair—but not free—competition under the watchful, mediating power of the govern-
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resurgence in traditional private sector unionism is unlikely. Thus,
employees’ demand for greater workplace voice and cooperation 29 will
not be satisfied by NLRA-style collective bargaining. This leads to
questions about the NLRA’s continued relevance and whether other
forms of employee representation and participation will develop.
B. Managerial Discretion or Contractual Governance: Which Works
Best?
How relevant is the NLRA for workers in the current U.S. labor
market? Apart from its role in governing the union organizational
and electoral process, the NLRA’s role in nonunion workplaces, which
cover over 90% of private sector employment, is modest. 30 Even for
firms that could face union organizing campaigns, the NLRA’s relevance has waned, as today’s workplaces no longer match the work
environment envisioned by the NLRA’s architects.
Implicit in the NLRA is a hierarchical view of management, in
which workplaces have top-down control moving from managers to
workers who have minimal discretion or decision-making authority.
This characterization may have been defensible during the NLRA’s
formative years, but not today. Traditional union governance regularizes and codifies worker tasks within a top-down command structure.
In contrast, modern workplaces typically require interaction and twoway communications between workers and supervisors, accompanied
by the use of bottom-up worker and managerial discretion that takes
advantage of “site-specific information.” 31 In contemporary workplaces, job hierarchies are often not clear-cut and worker decisionmaking is essential at most levels. 32
In addition, the current dominant governance structure in the
private sector is not traditional unionization but human resources

ment.” Id. at 583. Corporatist policymaking, therefore, seeks “fair union wages” and “responds to institutional actors such as unions and corporations rather than to individuals.”
Id. at 584.
29. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
30. The NLRA does apply to nonunion workforces in numerous circumstances, although employees’ knowledge of the statute’s relevance is uncertain. Most obviously, the
NLRA governs the organizational and electoral process before a union becomes the bargaining representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000). The NLRA also protects a wide variety
of concerted activity, even where there is no union on the scene (for example, safety complaints and pushes for higher wages). See id. § 158(a)(1); infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text. Moreover, as discussed in detail below, section 8(a)(2) regulates nonunion employers’ ability to create or support groups that involve discussions with employees over
terms and conditions of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); infra Part IV.A.
31. Site-specific information refers to information targeted to a particular work location, product, process, or time.
32. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125,
135-39 (1994); supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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management (HRM) systems in which personnel outcomes are determined by some combination of employer norms, governmental
regulation, and the incentives and constraints produced by market
forces. The principal market constraints derive from competition in
capital and labor markets. For the firm to survive over the long run,
it must earn a competitive return on capital, preventing an employer
from paying its workers a wage in excess—or, at least, well in excess—of the value they generate for the firm. In order to attract and
retain capable employees, however, workers must expect to receive
compensation similar to or in excess of what they could receive in alternative employment opportunities. Subject to these economic constraints—as well as governmental limits on actions involving discrimination, minimum pay, hours of work, safety, and the like 33 —
nonunion employers are free to dictate wages and workplace governance methods. If a wage and governance regime is costly relative to
the value of output, the employer will suffer losses. If wages are too
low or the work environment too harsh, the firm cannot attract and
retain sufficient numbers of workers to operate and survive. For enterprises operating between these upper and lower bounds, nonunion
employer fiat has proven to be a more dominant governance structure than collective bargaining contracts.
Michael Wachter identifies several factors in labor-contracting relationships that are critical for all firms, union and nonunion, and
that help to explain the current dominance of nonunion governance
structures. 34 Wachter argues that the predominance of nonunion
firms is primarily the result of low transaction costs coupled with the
ability of nonunion firms to deal effectively with match-specific investments, asymmetric information, and risk bearing. 35 Although unionized firms can handle these latter three factors through formal
contracting, nonunion companies manage these factors without the
use of explicit contracts, sometimes more and sometimes less effec-

33. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000) and in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 42 & 49 U.S.C.);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
34. See Michael L. Wachter, Theories of the Employment Relationship: Choosing Between Norms and Contracts, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 163, 167-71, 175 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 2004). Alan Hyde
has identified similar market failures—such as inelasticity of supply, collective action
problems, low trust and opportunism, and information asymmetry—that he argues provide
justification for labor regulation. See Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES
AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAWS: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK (Guy
Davidov & Brian Langille eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 16), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=896381.
35. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 167.
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tively than if they were unionized. 36 More significant is the disadvantage that union companies face due to high transaction costs.37
Match-specific investments refer to the time and money expended
to create higher workplace output that is not valued by or transferable to other firms. 38 As workers acquire these firm-specific skills, including the ability to deal with their co-workers, supervisors, suppliers, and customers, they become more valuable to their current employer than to alternative employers. 39 A problem associated with
match-specific investments is the possibility of a hold-up problem:
once a party makes such investments, the other party can behave opportunistically and capture ex post “quasi-rents.” 40 One solution is for
workers and firms to jointly invest in firm-specific skills that create
self-enforcing agreements that give both parties an interest in continuing the relationship rather than losing their investment. 41 Opportunistic behavior by nonunion employers is also constrained by
concern for their reputation among potential workers. 42
Asymmetric information involves differences in the ability of the
parties to monitor certain aspects of the job or firm, creating a risk
that the advantaged party will behave opportunistically. 43 For example, firms possess information on product demand superior to that of
workers, thereby providing firms the opportunity to misstate market
conditions to gain an advantage in workplace negotiations. 44 A result
of the product-demand asymmetry has been the widespread norm
under which firms rarely adjust wages downward but are relatively

36. See id. at 167-70.
37. See id. at 170.
38. See id. at 167.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 168. This difference between a worker’s value to the firm and value to the
outside labor market is a “quasi-rent” that a party may be able to capture by, for example,
threatening to end the work relationship unless they receive a larger share of profits. Id.
As Wachter notes, match-specific investments generally benefit both employers and employees; thus, the parties, and society, would be better off if the parties could make matchspecific investments without the risk of the other party attempting to capture any rents
that result after the initial investments are made. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 176. Not so easily solved is the hold-up problem faced by union firms
with respect to firm-specific capital investments. Once fixed capital is in place, unions can
capture—or “tax”—some share of the normal returns to investment. Knowing this, unionized firms will invest less, requiring a higher “before-tax” return. See Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52
ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984) (providing theory); see also Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions
Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 434-36 (2004) (evaluating empirical
literature for U.S., which generally finds lower investment in physical capital and research
and development among union firms).
43. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 168.
44. Id. at 168-69.
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free to adjust employment levels. 45 This self-enforcing mechanism
helps to diminish opportunistic use of the information asymmetry by
eliminating the incentive to understate the true level of demand in
order to justify a decrease in wages. 46 Employers lack incentive to
misstate demand with regard to employment levels because they do
not want to cut employment if demand is strong. 47 In unionized
workplaces, a similar but more formal arrangement exists, where
most collective-bargaining agreements allow employment level, but
not wage, adjustments absent negotiation. Unions may grant employer requests for wage concessions, but generally only if financial
records are disclosed to union representatives. 48
Risk bearing is another major problem in the employment relationship. Because most workers have incomes tied to their jobs, they
are in a poor position to bear company-specific earnings risk that
could result in fewer hours, lower wages and benefits, or job loss.49
Investors, in contrast, can readily diversify investments and bear
such risk. This difference in the ability to tolerate risk may cause
problems, as workers’ compensation and wealth are tied to factors
out of their control. More efficient risk bearing would insulate workers’ compensation from variances in firm revenue and profit. 50 Consequently, both union and nonunion workplaces tend to have relatively “fixed wage rates.” 51 In union companies, such rates are usually required under a collective bargaining agreement, and in nonunion companies, there is a largely self-enforcing implicit contract or
norm of fixed wages, with employer reputation playing a key enforcement role.
The principal advantage of nonunion pay and governance determination over union agreements is not from the above factors, but

45. Id.; see also TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION
(1999) (providing comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of why wages are
rigid downward).
46. Wachter, supra note 34, at 169.
47. Id.
48. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) (holding that an employer that claims an inability to provide wage increases must disclose financial information to support claim). Later decisions have limited employers’ disclosure obligation to instances where it explicitly states that it cannot afford a union demand. See Graphic
Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992).
49. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 169; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the
Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response
to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists,” 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1998).
50. Wachter, supra note 34, at 169.
51. The term “fixed wage rates” refers here to time-based pay (for example, an hourly
wage or annual salary) that does not vary with respect to temporary fluctuation in firm
revenues and costs.
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rather from transaction costs. 52 Because new information is constantly coming to a firm and its workers, it is prohibitively costly to
have explicit contract terms for every possible contingency. Although
many collective bargaining agreements have broad management
rights clauses, 53 a unionized company’s formalized contractual governance structure limits management’s and workers’ flexibility and
discretion. Revising contractual terms via the collective bargaining
process is difficult and costly. 54 By the same token, the inability to
revise the employer-employee relationship in response to external
market changes is also costly, all the more so in today’s rapidly
changing and highly competitive economic environment.
Ultimately, the workplace choice between informal nonunion governance—that is, employer fiat—and formal union governance should
depend on the answers to two questions. First, does management discretion or union governance better handle the contractual problems
found in all workplaces—match-specific investments, asymmetric information, risk, and transaction costs? For example, if management
can behave opportunistically and appropriate quasi-rents from immobile workers with little loss in firm reputation or worker productivity, then a formalized union contractual relationship becomes attractive. To the extent that unions can and do behave opportunistically by appropriating quasi-rents from shareholders to acquire wage
premiums, then the union form becomes less attractive. The second
question is, how competitive and dynamic are product and resource
markets? Where changes in technology, product markets, and financial markets are rapid, the costs of inflexibility or sluggishness in a
formalized environment are more severe. In such an environment,
the greater discretion and flexibility associated with nonunion governance are distinct advantages.
We contend that sectoral and technological changes, coupled with
rising competition in the U.S. and world economies, increasingly tilt
labor-contracting preferences toward nonunion governance. 55 Outside of today’s formalized union sector, most workers are employed in
firms where workplace governance is subject to constrained managerial discretion. At least as important, competition for employees re52. As Wachter notes, transaction costs are exacerbated in the face of more matchspecific investments and information asymmetries, as the need to regulate a higher potential for opportunistic behavior is more costly. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170.
53. See, e.g., St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 907, 927 (2004) (finding
employer’s proposal for broad management rights clause—which would allow it complete
discretion over hiring; promotions; discipline for cause; demotions; transfers; layoffs; recalls; setting productivity standards; contracting with third-parties to supply personnel;
closing, expanding, or relocating its facility; ceasing any job; and changing methods of operation—to be lawful).
54. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170.
55. See supra notes 10-11, 20-23 and accompanying text.

2007]

PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM

1145

quires that companies provide sufficient compensation and acquire a
reputation that will enable them to attract, motivate, and maintain a
productive work force. 56
In today’s economy, union governance has proven to be an expensive minority model. The disadvantage of traditional unionism in the
United States is most apparent in the effect of unions on profitability,
investment, growth, and other aspects of firm performance, where
improvements in productivity fail to offset the costs of union compensation premiums. 57 Any profitability gap between union and nonunion firms is sure to fuel and maintain strong management opposition to union organizing. 58 As long as there is a gap in firm performance, managerial discretion will remain the dominant form of
workplace governance.
The dominance of managerial discretion over contractual governance suggests that the future labor relations environment will look
much like it does today, with no major resurgence of unionization on
the horizon—at least traditional unions in the style envisaged by the
NLRA. 59 In the following section, we identify alternative paths that
might lead to workplace gains in a world in which traditional collective governance continues to lose relevance. The NLRA, however, still retains some significance, for both better and worse.
Under the alternatives proposed here, the NLRA could enjoy increased relevance by fostering a new model of collective action that
makes society better off.
III. UNFULFILLED DESIRES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES
A. What Workers Want
The purpose of this Article is to outline alternative paths that, although not politically likely, could lead to workplace gains in a world
where private sector unionism remains limited. To assess what gains
may be possible, we begin by asking what workers want. Labor reforms should address the concerns of workers while taking into account their impact on employers and the economy, such as invest-

56. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
57. See Hirsch, supra note 42, at 431-34.
58. There is some circularity here. No doubt much of management opposition to unions is the result of higher per unit costs and less management discretion. But a hostile attitude by management toward unions also makes it less likely one will see an enhancement
in performance owing to cooperation and collective voice within union companies.
59. This assumes no significant change in the NLRA’s statutory language, such as
narrowing the supervisory exception to the definition of an employee or requiring certification of a union based on a card-check majority, which could result in a substantial increase
in union membership.
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ment and job creation. Worker concerns, at least to the extent they
touch on collective action, are expressly protected by the NLRA. 60
In the early 1990s, the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations (commonly known as the “Dunlop Commission”) administered the Worker Representation and Participation
Survey. The results of this survey, along with similar surveys in
other countries, are comprehensively analyzed by Richard Freeman
and Joel Rogers in What Workers Want. 61 The survey results paint a
picture of significant unmet employee desires. First, many workers
want greater voice and participation in workplace decision-making,
although they seek individual voice as much as the collective right to
be heard associated with traditional unions. 62 Second, workers want
a more cooperative and less adversarial worker-management relationship, coupled with managerial support for entities that foster
worker participation. 63 Third, workers want not just to express themselves but also to have their views affect workplace outcomes in
meaningful ways. 64 And fourth, workers see management resistance
as the primary obstacle to worker participation and cooperation. 65
Despite some differences, the expressed desires and concerns of
workers are frequently similar in union and nonunion workplaces.66
We draw several inferences from these results. One conclusion is
that the current system often leads to an underproduction of worker
voice and participation, as well as worker-management cooperation,
in both union and nonunion workplaces. 67 Moreover, the adversarial

60. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
61. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21; see also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee
Participation/Representation Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 491, 491-92 (2001) (evaluating the conclusions drawn by Freeman and Rogers
from the worker survey).
62. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 32-33, 81-84. Approximately 50 million
employees (union and nonunion) wanted more voice at work, while nearly one-third (15
million) of nonunion employees of all but the smallest private sector firms wanted union
representation and over 90% of unionized employees wanted to keep their union representation. See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 187, 197-98 (2001) (citing FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra
note 21).
63. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 33, 84-88.
64. Id. at 75-79, 86-87. Freeman and Rogers note that the biggest gap in the amount
of influence that employees want, versus what they actually have, involves issues of benefits and pay, followed by training, and (to a much smaller degree) determining how and
when to perform work. Id. at 79.
65. Id. at 33, 88-91. See Weiler, supra note 62, at 187 (noting that 79% of nonunion
employees said that employees visibly seeking unionization would very likely lose their
jobs and 41% said that they would personally lose their job if they were identified as being
involved in a union campaign).
66. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 52.
67. See David I. Levine & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the
Firm’s Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183, 235-36
(Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
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relationship envisioned and reinforced by the NLRA does not appeal
to workers. Finally, greater voice and cooperation are unlikely to evolve
from the current status quo. These inferences open the door for potential
societal gains through welfare-enhancing regulatory reforms. 68
We identify four criteria by which labor regulation reforms should
be evaluated while recognizing that tradeoffs among the criteria may
exist. 69 First, proposals should be “welfare-enhancing” for the parties
and the economy. 70 Second, reforms should facilitate enhanced voice
(including some freedom to choose whether and how to exercise that
voice), encourage cooperation and discourage costly conflict, and increase the flow of information within nonunion workplaces. Third,
any arrangement should constrain rent-seeking and opportunistic
behavior by workers and employers. Fourth, reforms should allow for
variation across heterogeneous workplaces and be flexible over time.
There are several paths that might encourage welfare-enhancing
workplace governance. We focus on nonunion workplaces, although
what happens in the nonunion sector will affect outcomes in the union sector. By “nonunion,” however, we include ventures sponsored by
unions that do not follow the traditional union form. Indeed, we anticipate that unions will be an important catalyst for new workplace
governance structures, with such innovations taking on an increasingly significant role as long as union density remains low. Accordingly, we propose alternatives that reduce legal impediments to nontraditional forms of workplace governance, with the hope that these
labor law and employment regulation reforms can provide at least
modest social welfare gains. Before discussing these alternatives,
however, we identify some recent workplace governance innovations
that may establish the foundation for the future of private sector
collective action.
B. What Workers Get
The vast majority of private sector workers will never have an
opportunity to engage in collective voice and participation via traditional unionism. 71 Yet, despite legal hurdles to nontraditional workplace governance schemes, 72 the use of innovative “work groups” 73 is

68. See infra Part IV.
69. For example, under certain circumstances, increasing worker voice while limiting
rent-seeking behavior among workers may be mutually exclusive.
70. For a definition of welfare-enhancing reform, see supra p. 1135 & n.4. The value
to the parties of an enterprise can be defined as the sum of shareholder profits plus
worker rents (the excess of compensation over opportunity costs). See John M. Abowd,
The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
774, 777 (1989) (developing and applying this definition of enterprise value).
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See infra Parts IV.A, -E.
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growing rapidly. No doubt due to their recent lack of success at gaining members, 74 traditional unions have been at the forefront of developing new and different ways to reach and serve the interests of
workers. Whether these innovations are intended solely to boost traditional union membership or are merely a reflection of unions’ concern for workers, they represent potentially vital tools for providing
voice and participation to nonunion private sector employees. Although the use of welfare-enhancing work groups is expanding, they
face legal obstacles and reach only a small percentage of privatesector employees; thus, labor reforms should seek to further encourage their development.
Unions increasingly seek to organize workers outside the typical
NLRA election process. 75 One popular technique is to organize workers around issues other than those directly implicating workplace
concerns. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), for example, successfully organized janitors in Santa Clara County, California, despite significant hurdles that included the mostly Mexican
immigrant workers’ low English-language and job skills. 76 The
SEIU’s success was based in large part on a campaign that centered
on Mexican culture, involved religious and political leaders, and used
publicity techniques—including demonstrations and boycotts against
high-tech companies such as Apple Computer that hired the cleaning
contractors employing the janitors. 77 As union density levels remain
73. We refer to work groups broadly as any entity in which employees participate and
that serves some interest of employees. This use is similar to the “employee involvement”
programs that Freeman and Rogers define as including such disparate entities as “quality
circles and discussion groups, total quality management, self-directed work teams, safety
committees, production committees, [holiday] party committees,” and other small groups
that work on certain issues. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 129.
74. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
75. For example, unions have increasingly sought to avoid the Board’s election process by convincing employers, and pressing for legislation that would require employers, to
bargain with unions that have been selected by a majority of employees who signed cards
in support of the union. See, e.g., Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
The bill would require employers to recognize a union that obtains majority support from
employees via a “card-check” (cards signed by employees stating that they want the union
to represent them). In 2007, the House of Representatives passed the bill, which ultimately
failed in the Senate because supporters were not able to garner enough votes to end debate. See Supporters of Card Check Bill Fall Short of Votes Needed to Limit Senate Debate,
DAILY LAB. REP., June 27, 2007, at AA-2. Surprisingly, a majority of House members—in a
then-Republican-majority House—signed on to the 2005 version of the bill as co-sponsors.
See Majority of House Likely to Co-Sponsor ‘Card Check’ Bill, AFL-CIO Official Says,
DAILY LABOR REP., May 9, 2006, at A-6.
76. See STONE, supra note 10, at 224-25 (describing Justice for Janitors campaign and
other nontraditional union organizations); Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon
Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493,
497 (2002).
77. See Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond:
A New Form of Unionism in the Twenty-first Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS:
NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 22 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004) (examining rea-
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low, unions are likely to increase their use of such innovative strategies. Indeed, the 2005 split in the AFL-CIO was prompted by the belief of the SEIU and other major unions joining the Change To Win
Coalition that the AFL-CIO’s organizing efforts were too conservative. 78 Attempts at innovative organizing have also led to the formation of work groups that do not act as traditional unions but provide
an opportunity for worker voice.
These nontraditional work groups include a growing trend by unions forming affiliate organizations that do not deal with employers
on behalf of their members. For example, the AFL-CIO’s “Working
America” affiliate consists of members who are associated with labor
generally but are not formally represented by a union. 79 Its main
purpose has been to encourage action on local and national political
issues; yet, its potential to activate members for other projects is significant. 80 For example, Working America recently created a web site
that contains a database with information on over 60,000 companies,
including executive compensation, overseas outsourcing, and labor
and employment violations. 81 This type of information may be valuable to workers, arguably reducing information asymmetries and, in
some cases, the employer opportunistic behavior such asymmetries
allow. 82 However, to the extent that information provided by nontraditional worker groups or the employer is unreliable or systematically biased, it becomes more difficult to draw inferences regarding
the efficiency of enhanced communications.
Another interesting example of the increasingly blurry line between traditional unionism and less formal work groups is the allisons for success of Justice for Janitors campaign and asking whether a similar approach
would succeed more generally); see also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in
the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 951-54 (1994) (discussing historical examples of joint union-management councils); Hyde, supra note 76, at 497; see also Estlund, supra note 2, at 1604-06 (describing
“corporate campaigns,” in which unions use alternative methods of increasing economic
pressure on an employer—such as by targeting the employer’s customers).
78. See Michelle Amber, SEIU, IBT Disaffiliate from AFL-CIO, Announce Plan to Set
Up New Federation, DAILY LABOR REP., July 26, 2005, at AA-1.
79. See Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the
Internet to Reviving Union Fortunes 8, 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11298, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11298; Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 385, 387 (2006). The AFL-CIO also initiated an associate member program
that allowed nonunion or unemployed workers to pay reduced dues and enjoy certain privileges of union membership. See STONE, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that the AFL-CIO’s
primary goal was to support possible future organizing efforts).
80. See Freeman, supra note 79, at 19; Hyde, supra note 79, at 389.
81. See Amy Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs on Business: Workers Can Check Executive Salaries, Company Violations, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at D3 (noting also similar actions by two groups that monitor Wal-Mart’s conduct). The Working America database is available at http://www.workingamerica.org/jobtracker.
82. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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ance between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON). In announcing their alliance, the groups expressed their intent to form a National Worker Center Partnership,
which would further support community-based entities called
“worker centers,” which act as advocates for nonunion workers and
provide a large range of services to enhance both collective and individual voice. 83 Worker centers already have a significant presence in
the U.S., with over 140 centers in 31 states. 84
These new work groups aptly show how employee voice can be
satisfied through alternative institutions and that such institutions
can transform and evolve over time. The “WashTech” affiliate of the
Communication Workers of America (CWA), for instance, transformed from a nonbargaining entity to one that sought formal bargaining status and ultimately led to the creation of several entirely
different work groups. 85 The CWA initially formed WashTech only to
assist and lobby on behalf of Microsoft independent contractors and
temporary help agency workers, but it has begun to seek recognition
on behalf of some technology workers—and it even obtained card
check recognition from one employer. 86 WashTech’s success prompted
the CWA to form a national website for all technology workers, and
other unions have followed suit. 87
The examples above illustrate the possibility of providing services
to workers through innovative organizations not directly tied to the
workplace—that is, outside the traditional collective bargaining process. Although these groups have potential, they will not necessarily
flourish or become widespread. Such efforts are costly both in the initial and ongoing stages, and the union and philanthropic foundation
funds needed to support these groups are limited. Monies will flow to
these organizations only if they provide benefits greater than alternative uses of scarce funds.
More fundamentally, as pointed out by Joni Hersch, there is a basic tension in such organizations that may limit their development. 88
83. See Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO, Day Laborers Group Sign Pact to Advance Worker,
Immigration Rights, DAILY LABOR REP., Aug. 10, 2006, at A-4 (noting that some worker
centers may also provide legal services).
84. See id. NDLON already operates the largest association of worker centers, with
more than 40 centers focused on issues affecting day laborers. Id. Approximately 25 other
day labor centers operated by 28 other groups also exist. See id.
85. STONE, supra note 10, at 235.
86. See id. at 235; Hyde, supra note 79, at 390-91; see also id. at 410-14 (discussing
other examples of membership-based “alternative worker organizations”).
87. See Freeman, supra note 79, at 18-20 (describing International Association of Machinist’s “Cyberlodge,” Steelworkers union’s open membership plan, and the Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU)’s “Purple Ocean”).
88. See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207 (Richard B. Freeman
et al. eds., 2005).
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Hersch asks whether a large interest group not attached to the
workplace can successfully provide services to workers and lobby for
their well-being. 89 Hersch examines in some detail the experience of
Working Today, which began as a group broadly focused on services
and lobbying for independent workers but evolved into a group claiming an overriding social agenda while focusing more narrowly on
making benefits portable across jobs. 90 Generalizing from this analysis, Hersch models a group that provides services, lobbies, and represents members. 91 Tension arises because the organization provides a
good that is partly public—that is, its benefits spill over to nonmembers. 92 It must attract members based on the private goods it provides while raising money from foundations or large entities interested in the public outcome. 93 The implication drawn by Hersch is
that there is no common blueprint for such an organization—
different types of groups can and will arise. 94 But their success and
growth is not guaranteed. 95
As described in more detail below, work groups can provide a diverse set of services for workers and satisfy to some degree the desire
for workplace voice and participation. 96 The NLRA, however, has not
been hospitable to these nontraditional work groups, effectively reducing the choice set for most workers to either traditional unions or
management discretion (albeit constrained), with little in between. 97
What follows, therefore, are proposals to make the NLRA more open
to welfare-enhancing innovations that facilitate worker voice, par-

89. See id. at 207-08, 226-28.
90. Id. at 212-16. In 2003, Working Today’s benefit and advocacy services were renamed the “Freelancers Union.” See Freelancers Union, About Us, available at
http://www.freelancersunion.org/about-us-home/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
91. Hersch, supra note 88, at 216-18.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 227-28.
95. See id. at 226-28.
96. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
97. Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman find that underlying preferences among workers are roughly similar in the U.S. and the U.K., but that workplace outcomes differ because the U.K. provides a greater range of institutional options than does the U.S. Alex
Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, Worker Needs and Voice in the US and the UK 22 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12310, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12310. The authors conclude,
The different choices on offer in the two countries appear to affect the different
responses of UK and US workers to fairly similar workplace needs/problems.
The dichotomous choice between collective bargaining and no representation in
the US produces a smaller rate of unionization in the US that manifests itself
in greater unfilled demand for unions among non-union workers than in the
UK; whereas the wider choice of voice institutions in the UK attracts many to
take the free rider option.
Id.
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ticipation, and cooperation in the workplace, in particular for private
sector nonunion workers.
IV. ENCOURAGING WORKER VOICE AND PARTICIPATION IN NONUNION
WORKPLACES
A. Reforming the NLRA’s “Company Union” Prohibition
Any discussion of expanding the development of nontraditional
work groups must focus on the NLRA’s broad “company union” prohibition. This prohibition, as currently interpreted by the NLRB, limits employers’ ability to lawfully establish work groups that may provide welfare-enhancing employee voice and participation. Accordingly, we propose a legislative modification that would significantly
reduce the number and types of groups that fall under the company
union ban.
In its attempt to prevent employer-controlled unions via section
8(a)(2) and, by inclusion, section 2(5), 98 the NLRA also limits less formal employer-sponsored work groups—even those that do not bargain on behalf of employees. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employer domination or support for any labor organization. 99 Section 2(5) defines a
“labor organization” as any entity in which employees participate and
which has a purpose to deal with employers over grievances, disputes, wages, pay rates, hours of employment, or work conditions.100
The legitimate goals underlying the inclusion of section 8(a)(2) in
the 1935 Wagner Act include an attempt to prevent employerdominated work groups that would interfere with employees’ freedom
to choose an independent, traditional union and to bar representation
that, because of ties to employers, was viewed as inherently
flawed. 101 The fear that employers may create entities that interfere

98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (2000).
99. Id. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization”).
100. Id. § 152(5) (defining labor organization as “any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work”).
101. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992-94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148
(7th Cir. 1994); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 129-33 (describing “employer coercion” and
“false consciousness” rationales); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the
Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 174-76 (1993) (discussing
possible rationales of section 8(a)(2)); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1661-62 (noting that many
early twentieth-century employee participation groups were progressive, but other employers created such groups in anticipation of federal labor legislation and in hopes of barring independent unions from the workplace). An informative volume edited by Bruce
Kaufman and Daphne Gottlieb Taras includes several papers examining companysupported worker groups in the U.S. and in Canada. See NONUNION EMPLOYEE
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with employees’ choice whether or not to seek collective representation led to section 2(5)’s broad definition of “labor organization,”
which the Board subsequently expanded further. 102
The Board has concluded that it will classify an entity as a labor
organization under section 2(5) “if (1) employees participate, (2) the
organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of ‘dealing with’
employers, and (3) these dealings concern ‘conditions of work’ or concern other statutory subjects [listed in section 2(5)], such as grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment.” 103 The current expansive reach of section 2(5), and by extension section 8(a)(2), results in large part from the Board’s interpretation of “dealing with employers.” According to the Board, an entity is
“dealing with” an employer wherever there is a “bilateral mechanism
involving proposals from [an] employee committee concerning the
subjects listed in Sec[tion] 2(5), coupled with real or apparent consideration of those proposals by management.”104 In particular, “dealing”
is present if there is “a pattern or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management
responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or
deed, and compromise is not required.” 105 The Board has broadly interpreted this definition to cover entities with no formal structure,
even if they have no elected officers, bylaws, regular meetings, or
dues and do not engage in anything close to collective bargaining. 106
Any employer support or control over such an organization—for instance, creating the group or running its meetings—violates section
8(a)(2). 107
REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Bruce E. Kaufman &
Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000) [hereinafter NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION].
102. See Barenberg, supra note 7, at 1459 & n.347 (citing, as examples, NLRB v. Pa.
Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938); Int’l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 354
(1936); Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 710 (1936)).
103. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
104. Id. at 995 n.21 (stating also that “[a] unilateral mechanism, such as a ‘suggestion
box,’ or ‘brainstorming’ groups or meetings, or analogous information exchanges, does not
constitute ‘dealing with’ ”). Since the Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Cabot Carbon Co, “dealing with” has been interpreted more broadly than
“collective bargaining.” See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210-13 (1959). Electromation also suggested, but ultimately did not decide, that a labor organization must
serve in some sort of representational capacity. See 309 N.L.R.B. at 944 n.20. The Board’s
interpretation of section 2(5)’s scope came in part as a reaction to some courts’ more narrow interpretation of “labor organization.” See id. at 996-97 (rejecting NLRB v. Scott &
Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 1982) (requiring employees to believe that an entity
is a union to constitute a “labor organization” under section 2(5))).
105. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
106. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993-94 (concluding that legislative history of
section 8(a)(2) required a broad interpretation of “labor organization” in order to ban “employee representation committees,” which had little formal structure); Estreicher, supra
note 32, at 126 & n.3 (1994) (citing Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203).
107. See E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 897-98; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995.
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The expansiveness of these provisions restricts development of
nonunion vehicles for employer-employee cooperation and productivity-enhancing worker voice. 108 This is because the NLRA allows no
middle ground—employees often must choose between traditional union representation or no representation at all.109
One of many illustrations of the vast reach of the company union
prohibition is the Board’s decision in Grouse Mountain Lodge. 110 The
employer in that case operated a Montana resort that was facing an
organizing campaign. 111 Among several unfair labor practices occurring during the campaign, the Board found that the employer violated section 8(a)(2) because of its support for the “Quality Assurance
(QA) Committee.” 112 The QA Committee consisted of a suggestion box
and various meetings; all employees were invited to the meetings,
where they could offer ideas to management and discuss issues such
as work conditions, guest matters, and safety concerns. 113 Although
the QA Committee had no structural documents, bylaws, or procedures, the Board found that it was a labor organization. 114 According
to the Board, the QA Committee satisfied the “dealing with” requirement, in part, because the employer sought input from the committee about what should be served for employees’ free lunches and
for which holidays overtime pay should be provided. 115 It is difficult
to imagine how this type of employer-employee interaction interferes
with employees’ labor rights. This type of virtually structureless
feedback is often indispensable to companies in the modern economy;
the Board’s current company union jurisprudence unjustifiably treats
such beneficial interactions as unlawful.
The potential benefits of employer-supported work groups are
widespread, although not universal. 116 In some cases, managers will
108. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1545-46 (discussing different approaches that Congress may have taken in 1935).
109. See id. at 1546.
110. 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 F. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. Id. at 1328.
112. Id. at 1334-37.
113. Id. at 1335.
114. Id. at 1335-37.
115. Id. at 1336 (concluding that suggestions and ideas initially raised by individual
employees are “debated amongst the employees . . . who have attended the meeting, sometimes altered, and then submitted to the [employer] in the name of QA program rather than
as an individual employee’s suggestion. Thereafter, the [employer] either accepts or rejects
the ideas or returns them to the next QA program meeting for further development.”).
116. Studies examining employee participation programs typically conclude that they
have positive (if not always large) effects on productivity and employee earnings, but do
not in general decrease per unit labor costs and increase profitability. See Hirsch, supra
note 49, at 968-76, 982 (discussing benefits of employee participation in workplace decision-making and citing studies). See Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, Do “High Performance” Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?, 54 I NDUS. & LAB . REL.
REV. 737 (2001) (discussing methodological difficulties in measuring causal effects of
workplace organization, surveying prior studies, and providing longitudinal evidence).
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enthusiastically adopt measures to enhance opportunities for employee voice to take advantage of the production improvements and
increased job satisfaction gained from employee input; in other cases,
managers will adopt such measures by necessity to remain competitive in the marketplace. 117 In sharp contrast to the strictly hierarchical manufacturing model of the 1930s, such input is considerably
more important in the modern economy, where the need for workers
to think and make suggestions is much higher than when the NLRA
was enacted. 118 Employee work groups may also provide an alternative to resolve workplace disputes that both employers and employees
find more beneficial than other methods. 119 Employers that are open
to more employee voice may also discover that employees develop
more loyalty and attachment to the firm. 120
Labor law reform relaxing the Board’s current company union
prohibition would effectively expand choices for many employees.
Employees who have little prospect for seeing formal collective bargaining in their workplace would have the option to take part in a
Lowering the cost of adopting such programs should increase their use and increase
economy-wide productivity.
117. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 7, 131-35 (describing survey results
showing that a significant number of managers favor more employee voice in joint work
committees and discussing productivity gains possible through employee involvement programs); Weiler, supra note 62, at 198-200; cf. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 982 (citing data on
employee ownership effects on firm performance). But see LEVINE, supra note 11, at 63
(stating that “[m]any middle- and lower-level managers resist and sometimes sabotage
employee involvement” because greater employee autonomy “may be threatening to supervisors and managers”).
118. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 885-90, 927 n.826 (discussing numerous examples of successful flexible work teams and citing studies showing improvement in productivity, quality, and innovation from increased employee involvement); Estreicher, supra
note 32, at 135-39 (describing importance of “smart” workers who can fully understand the
business, make use of new technologies, and make suggestions to the employer).
119. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 164-67 (discussing workplace committees that monitor labor standards); Hyde, supra note 101, at 152-54 (describing advantages
of “works councils” over other responses to work grievances, such as quitting, internalizing
complaints, or litigating).
120. See Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 133-35 (1993) (discussing the benefits
of the “shared enterprise” model of employment in Germany and Japan). The potential
benefits of employer-run work groups have been recognized in other areas as well. For example, a failed amendment to the Occupational Health and Safety Act would have required health and safety committees in most workplaces. See H.R. 1280, 103d Cong. § 201
(1993); H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong. § 201 (1991); see also Estlund, supra note 2, at 1541 n.69
(citing Gregory R. Watchman, Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees
Under OSHA and the NLRA, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 82-89 (1994)) (stating that
such groups can improve safety); Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the
Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 93-100 (2002) (discussing state legislation mandating workplace safety committees); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing
Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 373, 431 (2000) (discussing a possible correlation between employee involvement in health and safety committees and reduced workplace accidents).
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group that provides some outlet for voice while enjoying NLRA protection for their participation.
The possible gains from the flexibility and ingenuity of employersupported work groups are well illustrated by the variety in the
structure of the groups themselves. Avenues for employee voice may
arise from groups formed for nonproduction purposes, such as a diversity committee. Moreover, other entities—such as work teams
that concentrate on certain projects or production issues or groups
that are focused on procedures, policies, or rules—can foster employee input and feedback. 121 It is not surprising, therefore, that
studies have shown that the use of some form of employee work
group is reasonably widespread and growing. 122
Although unions are concerned that employer-supported work
groups might replace them, 123 it is also possible that the process of
electing worker representatives or exercising voice in nonunion companies would complement the organization of traditional unions. 124
Other countries have much higher union density rates, even though
they do not foreclose employer-initiated or -supported work groups
that might engage in discussions over compensation and working
conditions. For example, employer-supported nonunion work
groups are permitted and not uncommon in Canada, 125 where tra-

121. See Estreicher, supra note 32, at 127 (describing production-focused groups as
“on-line,” as distinguished from nonproduction “off-line” groups).
122. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 119, 120 exhibit 5.1 (describing reports
that one-third of employees said their employer met with committees of employees to resolve problems and over half said their employer had some form of an employee involvement system); LEVINE, supra note 11, at 7 (citing study showing that in 1990, “88 percent
of responding [Fortune 1000] companies had at least 1 percent of their workers involved in
employee-involvement programs”); Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee
Involvement and Participation Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747-54 (1999) (describing results of various studies and noting
that most of these groups are probably not affected by section 8(a)(2)).
123. See Jonathon P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees: A Union Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 101, at 498, 507-08.
124. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1544, 1551, 1601 (arguing that allowing employer
work groups might spur innovation among unions); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 153-54;
Barenberg, supra note 77, at 831-35 (discussing pre-NLRA company unions morphing into
traditional, independent unions); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What
Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 145 (2003) (noting that “[t]he steel unions and the National Education Association . . . evolved in part from company unions”).
But see F REEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 141-44 (describing survey results showing that workers at firms with employee involvement programs have less interest in
traditional unions, although noting that such programs at unionized firms do not
lessen union support).
125. For an informative history of Canada’s law in this area, see LeRoy, supra note 11,
at 1669-73; see also Weiler, supra note 62, at 199 n.44 (noting the broad array of employee
involvement programs permitted under Canadian labor law).
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ditional unions and collective bargaining operate at levels higher
than in the U.S. 126
Some countries, Germany being the prime example, mandate
that some form of elected employee work group be available to workers—a right that has now been adopted by the European Union. 127
German employers are often supportive of these “works councils,”
finding that a good working relationship with them is productive.128
More to the point, German works councils are often closely tied to
trade unions and have historically fed unions with new members. 129
It is true, however, that although activation of a works council is a
simple process, workers do not find it necessary in a sizable share of
German workplaces, and the recent decline in works council members reinforces a slide in union membership. 130
Further, China’s government-sponsored union, which does not
typically engage in collective bargaining, has done what previously
seemed impossible: convince Wal-Mart to voluntarily allow the union
to represent all of its employees in that country. 131 It is not clear
what influence the Chinese union will have on Wal-Mart’s operations

126. See Kaufman, supra note 122, at 805-08 (arguing that Canadian union density of
34% is due, in part, to independent unions co-opting employer-initiated work groups and a
legal regime that better protects employee free choice).
127. The European Union Charter contains a provision establishing a fundamental
right of workers or their representatives to information and consultation in the workplace.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 27, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 15,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/charter-solidarity.html. Paul
Weiler has suggested that the U.S. adopt basically the same requirements as Germany.
See WEILER, supra note 8, at 282-95. Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g.,
Hyde, supra note 101, at 152-53 & n.9 (discussing adopting works councils similar to those
required in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); Summers, supra note 120, at
131 (supporting adopting modified versions of the German works councils system and arguing that the U.S. can learn much from the German and Japanese experience); Richard
B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion
Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13,
63 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (suggesting encouragement of such
groups through government incentives).
128. See Summers, supra note 120, at 132-33 (noting that Japanese employers typically accept that country’s similar “enterprise unions” as well); see also CHARLES C.
HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING
CORPORATION 177-231 (1988) (arguing for “associational unions” that exist to develop and
enforce agreements at a specific employer); LEVINE, supra note 11, at 3-4, 115-21 (discussing widespread employee involvement in Europe and Japan).
129. See John T. Addison et al., The (Parlous) State of German Unions, 28 JOURNAL OF
LABOR RES. 3, 10 (2007).
130. Id. at 13-14 (showing that in 2004, just one in ten German establishments had
works councils in the private sector, which included 47% of all employees in Western Germany and 38% in Eastern Germany (the significantly higher employee- versus establishment-density resulting because works councils exist primarily at larger establishments)). In addition to declining union density, there also has been greater decentralization of bargaining. Id.
131. See David Barboza, Wal-Mart Will Unionize in All of China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2006, at C4.
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in that country. However, it is hard to imagine that having Wal-Mart
or other nonunion companies in the U.S. engage in discussions with
worker representatives will result in lower private sector union density than would otherwise exist.
This diversity of employer-supported worker participation
schemes illustrates the ability of work groups to adapt to the unique
circumstances of a wide variety of companies, workers, and societies.
Such flexibility and innovation provide more promise for employee
participation and voice in the private sector than do traditional unions, although management and workers in many establishments
will not opt to implement vehicles for employee voice. We should see
adoption of employer-supported work groups where such activity has
the greatest potential benefit. These potential benefits from nonunion
work groups are currently limited, to some unknown degree, by the
NLRA’s expansive company union prohibition. To the extent that
employer-supported work groups created as a result of NLRA reforms
prove effective, competitive pressures will induce their adoption by
other companies. If ineffective, such reforms will have little impact.
By making many of these groups unlawful—particularly the most
effective ones, which often involve substantial interactions between
employees and management—the NLRA’s company union ban has
impeded the development of groups that could provide significant
improvement for workers, employers, society, and possibly even traditional unions. Consequently, we support modification of the
NLRA’s prohibition against employer-sponsored work groups. A
change that best reflects our four reform criteria 132 would maintain
restrictions against company domination of traditional unions while
permitting the development of less formal work groups in nonunion
companies. These work groups would not participate in formal collective bargaining, but could communicate with management and participate in workplace discussions, including those regarding pay,
grievances, and working conditions.
Our recommendation is to change section 2(5)’s definition of “labor organization” 133 to include only those entities that have been certified by the Board or recognized by an employer as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of employees under section
9 of the NLRA. 134 The modification would permit employers to create
or maintain work groups that discuss terms and conditions of employment, so long as those groups are not labor organizations as de-

132. See supra p. 1147.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), -(c), -(e) (2000) (stating Board’s certification process and authority to evaluate questions about whether an exclusive bargaining representative enjoys
support from a majority of employees).
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fined by the revised section 2(5). 135 This offers employers virtually
unfettered opportunity to promote the sharing of information without
the specter of a section 8(a)(2) violation while maintaining the major
policy aims of that provision. Section 8(a)(2)’s goal of preventing employers from coercing or misleading employees into thinking that
they have independent representation would be maintained, as employees would be well aware whether or not they are represented by
an independent union. Moreover, as is currently the case, an employer would still be unable to discuss conditions of employment with
its work group if there was already a union on the scene.136
Unlike other proposals, such as the failed TEAM Act, 137 which do
not call for changes to the definition of labor organization, the pro-

135. This proposal has similarities with a proposal made by Samuel Estreicher, see
Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150 (proposing “limiting section 2(5)’s definition of ‘labor organization’ to entities that ‘bargain with’ their employer over terms and conditions of employment”), and a House-passed Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, see H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 54
(1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 345 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY] (stating that it would not be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to form or maintain “a committee of employees and [to discuss]
with it matters of mutual interest, including [terms and conditions of work], if the Board
has not certified or the employer has not recognized a representative . . . under section 9”).
This bill took care to allow “discussions” without imposing a formal duty to “bargain” on
the organization or the employer. See id.; LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1704-06 (providing history of the bill). Indeed, the bill stated that section 8(a)(2) would still bar an employer from
creating a formal organization with common characteristics of a labor union. See H.R. REP.
NO. 80-245, at 53, reprinted in HISTORY, supra, at 344.
136. Any attempt to deal with represented employees about terms and conditions of
employment without going through the union violates the employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA and is considered unlawful “direct dealing.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of [its] employees”); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684
(1944) (stating that it is unlawful under the NLRA for an “employer to disregard the bargaining representative by negotiating with individual employees”); Toledo Typographical
Union No. 63 v. NLRB (Toledo Blade), 907 F.2d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining
that while “[a]n employer may deal directly with its employees . . . if it . . . obtains the consent of their union,” it may not negotiate directly with an employee before bargaining with
the union first); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 151-52.
137. The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Cong.
(1996) (TEAM Act), would have lowered restrictions on employer-sponsored workplace participation groups. Id. at § 3. The TEAM Act would have created a proviso to section 8(a)(2)
stating that it is not unlawful
for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees who participate to at least the
same extent practicable as representatives of management participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have,
claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representatives of the
employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with
the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between
the employer and any labor organization, except . . . a case in which a labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a).
Id. The House and Senate passed the TEAM Act, which President Clinton then vetoed. See
142 CONG. REC. H8816 (1996).
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posed modification ensures that non-section 9 work groups cannot
take advantage of the protections that independent labor organizations enjoy under the NLRA. 138 For example, the certification, recognition, and contract bars—which preclude rival unions from seeking
to represent workers for a period of time after an incumbent union
becomes the employees’ representative 139 or during much of the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement 140 —will not apply to these
work groups. Thus, employers and employees would be able to engage in information-sharing without fear of violating the NLRA.
Information-sharing would also be promoted by the clarity of the
test—it would be unmistakable, ex ante, whether or not a group is a
section 2(5) labor organization. 141 Employers who want to establish a
work group may do so without risk of a future section 8(a)(2) violation. Importantly, the modification favors neither traditional unionism nor employer-supported work groups; employees who want representation by an independent union may still pursue that goal with138. One could also exclude groups created by employers to thwart organizing campaigns, see Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150-51; Summers, supra note 120, at 142 (arguing
that a plan should not be allowed if an organizing campaign or representation proceeding
was pending), or where an employer had recently committed an unfair labor practice, id.
(arguing for ban where unfair labor practice charge was pending or where unfair labor
practice has been been committed within the last three years); Hyde, supra note 101, at
190 (same). There have been many other alternatives proposed as well. See, e.g., Charles B.
Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 420, 430-31 (1992) (proposing no section 8(a)(2) violation unless
an employer unilaterally establishes a group “for the purpose of chilling or precluding employee organizing”); Hyde, supra note 101, at 187-90 (arguing (1) that “labor organization”
should be defined as any group that employees participate in and that “deals with” employers concerning any condition of work, (2) that “deals with” should be broadly defined
and should include communicating or exercising delegated management authority, and (3)
that an employer should be allowed to support a labor organization if approved by employees via a secret ballot for a specified time period); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1708-09 (proposing that section 8(a)(2) allow employers to create a group that discusses work conditions
but does not claim or seek to be an exclusive bargaining representative); Summers, supra
note 120, at 142-45 (proposing exceptions to section 8(a)(2) for plans that do not require an
employer to bargain but that, among other things, allow employees to modify the plan’s
structure, separate supervisors and nonsupervisors, and allow employee-elected representatives); Weiler, supra note 62, at 200 (arguing that section 8(a)(2) should ban only company-sponsored unions that collectively bargain, rather than merely deal, with the employer).
139. Under the certification bar, an incumbent union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for typically a year following certification; during that year, the
Board will not order an election and the employer may not withdraw recognition, even if
another union claims to have majority support. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-104
(1954). Under the recognition bar, an incumbent union enjoys a irrebuttable presumption
of majority status for a “reasonable period” after being recognized by the employer as the
employees’ representative. E.g., Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1966).
140. Under the contract bar, an active collective bargaining agreement will inoculate
the incumbent union from challenges to its majority status for a maximum of three years.
See, e.g., Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
141. See Summers, supra note 120, at 141 (stressing the need for “reasonably clear”
line between lawful and unlawful employee participation groups).
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out interference by the employer. 142 This heightens employee choice
and encourages competition between unions and employers to fulfill
employee demands.
Employer-supported work groups may also benefit from not being
considered labor organizations. Avoiding that designation frees a
group from the risk of liability for unfair labor practices under section 8(b) of the NLRA 143 and the reporting and disclosure requirements under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) of 1959. 144 Freedom from these laws could help spur the
growth of work groups by allowing them to develop outside of federal
labor restrictions. 145 Similarly, in order to keep regulatory and employer costs low, there would be few, if any, legal requirements attached to the structure of employer-supported work groups. For example, although many employers would designate that employee
representatives be freely elected, there would be no such requirement. 146 Despite the lack of legal requirements, self-enforcing
mechanisms would often advance employees’ interests, as work
142. See Weiler, supra note 62, at 178 (stating that key interests in labor law “are
those of workers, rather than the unions who represent them or the companies who
employ them”).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000) (establishing “labor organization” unfair labor practices, such as restraints on picketing).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) (establishing LMRDA reporting and disclosure obligations); 29 U.S.C. § 439 (2000) (imposing fines or incarceration for failing to file required reports under LMRDA); cf. Hyde, supra note 79, at 392-93 (reporting that saving money by
avoiding the need to service collective bargaining agreements was one reason that the executive director of one group, ROC-NY, gave for ROC-NY organizing as a charity) (citing
Interview with Saru Jayaraman, Executive Director, Restaurant Opportunities Ctr. of
N.Y., in Newark, N.J. (Apr. 5, 2005)). Note that the LMRDA’s definition of labor organization is broader than the NLRA’s definition. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (2000) (NLRA definition), with 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (2000) (LMRDA definition). Section 402(i) defines “labor organization” as
any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee,
joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a
national or international labor organization, other than a State or local
central body.
§ 402(i). Such groups would also avoid—perhaps less defensibly—the requirement to observe democratic processes and a duty of fair representation to its members. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 411-415, 481-504 (2000) (LMRDA democratic requirements); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l
v. O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 73-78 (1991) (discussing the duty of fair representation).
145. See Hyde, supra note 79, at 392-94 (discussing group, ROC-NY, that obtained a
contract on behalf of some New York City restaurant workers that was expressly not a collective bargaining agreement). However, Hyde rightly questions whether ROC-NY would
be able to avoid a finding that it was a labor organization if its status was ever challenged.
Id. at 393 n.31.
146. Subsequent discussions of conditional deregulation and a change in the labor law
default each include the requirement that work group representatives be freely elected. See
infra Parts IV.B-C.
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groups without strong support from the workforce would have little credibility or effectiveness.
Current law hinders the flexibility and originality that could
serve to fill a much-needed niche for workers. By reducing the costs
of creating nontraditional work groups, the proposal would allow
more workers to fulfill their desire for some form of representation or
voice at work. Moreover, because participation in these groups would
generally be considered concerted and protected activity under the
NLRA, employers could not retaliate against or interfere with such
activity without violating the NLRA. 147
Concurrent with Congress’ amending of section 2(5) to encourage
employer-supported nonunion work groups, however, it should also
adopt other changes to the NLRA that strengthen the Board’s ability
to remedy employer unfair labor practices or other inappropriate obstacles to organizing. Employers are currently able to interfere with
employees’ decision whether or not to pursue collective representation with little cost. The lack of a significant penalty for interfering
with employees’ rights calls into question whether those rights have
much value. Strengthening the Board’s enforcement powers while
also relaxing the company union ban would give employers more
freedom to establish work groups and, at the same time, provide better protection of employees’ right to freely choose whether to participate in the employer-sponsored group rather than a more independent form of collective activity.
One reform particular to the company union prohibition is to
change current holdings that refuse to consider a section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice as a “continuing violation.” 148 The result is that an
employer can create and dominate a labor organization, sign a contract “negotiated” with the organization, and—if not challenged
within the NLRA’s six-month statute of limitations 149 —avoid any section 8(a)(2) problems during the life of the contract. 150 The harm created by a contract negotiated with an employer-dominated labor organization should not be permitted to continue simply because, as is
often the case, no one was prepared to file a section 8(a)(2) charge at

147. See infra note 206.
148. E.g., Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 419-23 (1960) (holding that
section 10(b)’s six-month statute of limitations bars challenge to lawfulness of execution of
collective-bargaining agreement and “continuing violation” theory is inapplicable if enforcement of agreement is not, by itself, unlawful); Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 816,
824 n.19 (1980) (citing Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. 411), enforced, 728 F.2d 1254 (9th
Cir. 1984).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000).
150. See Armored Transp., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 143, 145, 148 (2001), enforcement denied
on other grounds sub nom. AT Sys. W., Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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the time the contract was signed. 151 Although this is not a widespread problem, such a change is consistent with the philosophy of
the NLRA and the reforms proposed in this Article.
It is also important that employees’ right to choose independent
union representation be adequately protected. In this vein, Samuel
Estreicher has identified the need to proscribe work groups created
in response to an organizing campaign, to strengthen protections
against retaliatory discharges, to increase union access to employees,
and to decrease the incentive to delay the representational process
through litigation. 152 Other changes could include permitting private rights of action, 153 increasing the use of injunctive relief, 154
and accelerating elections. 155
More generally, Congress needs to strengthen the Board’s limited
remedial power. 156 For instance, although employer-dominated
“sham” unions are not widespread, the Board’s sole remedial power
against even the most egregious section 8(a)(2) violations is to post
notices and to disestablish such entities, neither of which is likely to
dissuade employers committed to creating them. 157 Giving the Board
enhanced authority to punish employer unfair labor practices—
particularly through monetary fines—would impose real costs that

151. Generally, section 8(a)(2) charges are filed by independent unions that seek to
represent a unit of employees only to find an employer-sponsored labor organization already in place. See id. at 148.
152. Estreicher, supra note 32, at 155.
153. Employers currently have the right, under section 303 of the LMRA, to sue in federal court for damages caused by union secondary boycotts. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (providing suit for damages caused by violation of section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (2000)). Providing a private right of action would also enhance nonunion employees’ exercise of their right to pursue collective action. Few employees are aware that
the NLRA applies in the nonunion setting, and the NLRB could do more to advertise that
fact. Private actions, particularly if attorney’s fees and other damages were available,
would drastically increase nonunion employees’ exercise of their NLRA rights, thereby
maintaining the act’s relevance in an economy that is overwhelmingly nonunion. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1554-58 (arguing that private right of action would provide more effective enforcement than currently exists under the NLRA).
154. Cf. Weiler, supra note 62, at 189-90, 205-06 (arguing for quicker enforcement of
reinstatement orders through injunctive relief, expedited elections, and a ban on permanent replacement of strikers). The Board General Counsel may seek injunctive relief
against employer unfair labor practices pursuant to section 10(j), but must seek such relief
against union secondary boycotts under section 10(l). See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), -(l) (2000).
155. See Craver, supra note 138, at 420 (proposing maximum of two weeks between petition and election); Kaufman, supra note 122, at 800 (proposing four-week maximum).
Other options, which are not endorsed here, include mandated employer neutrality and
card-check recognition, as the proposed Employee Free Choice Act would require. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
156. Criticism of the Board’s limited remedial power has been widespread. See, e.g.,
Estlund, supra note 2, at 1536-40 (also citing other criticisms).
157. See Kaufman, supra note 122, at 747, 776-77 (describing management statements
and NLRB enforcement statistics indicating some employers run work groups that they know
may be unlawful because of weak penalties and low risk of a section 8(a)(2) violation).
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an employer must take into account before attempting to interfere
with employees’ rights under the NLRA. 158
The current company union prohibition harms both employers
who want more input from their workers and employees who would
like to provide such input but do not want traditional union representation. 159 By removing the threat of a section 8(a)(2) violation for
employers that value employee input, whether as a benefit to the
firm or as a means to attract workers, 160 the proposed modification
expands opportunities for worker voice and participation. It is difficult to see how the net effect of this expansion would be detrimental. 161 Employees preferring an independent union could still pursue
that path. Employees who want enhanced voice without a union or
are employed at a firm where unionization is not a realistic possibility would be better off if the NLRA’s company union restriction
were modified to allow more development of employer-supported
work groups. 162
As noted, it is unlikely that weakening the company union prohibition would greatly damage traditional unionism. 163 The proposal
158. Cf. Weiler, supra note 62, at 188 (noting that Board damage awards in even discriminatory discharge cases are significantly limited and delayed).
159. As Clyde Summers has suggested, the current legal framework—particularly the
extent to which it allows employers to fight unionization—is likely a significant factor in
many employees’ stated preference for more voice, but not through a traditional union. See
Summers, supra note 120, at 138. Absent substantial employer hostility, employees may
prefer traditional unions to a much larger degree. Id. The proposal here addresses part of
this problem by pairing the modification of the company union prohibition with remedial
changes that would increase enforcement and penalties for employer unfair labor practices.
See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
160. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 34 (describing survey result that employees typically welcome employer-initiated employee-involvement programs, although
would prefer them to give employees more authority).
161. The lack of a significant cost to this change is in relation to the current state of
unionism in the U.S. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1547, 1550-51. It is true, of course, that
the modification proposed here would allow plans that do not necessarily represent a majority of workers and that could give employers more leeway to set up a sham organization
that only pretends to take employee input into account. See Summers, supra note 120, at
147. These possibilities, however, will often be discernable to employees—at least eventually—which undermines their threat. Moreover, employers seeking to infringe employees’
freedom to unionize currently have many other options, most of which are far more effective; thus, the possibility that an occasional employer will have another weapon in its arsenal is not a significant cost. Indeed, if penalties against employers increase, it is likely
that this potential cost is vastly outweighed by the benefits of greater protection against
employer interference. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
162. Indeed, prior to the enactment of the NLRA, some company unions were recognized as providing benefits to employees through assistance with grievances; information
gathering; communication with employers; and improving wages, benefits, and other conditions of work. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 849-51. Barenberg also notes that the
benefits of company unions were often ultimately overshadowed by unmet employee desires, and in the 1920s, most employers eventually discontinued their company unions;
however, he recognizes that the earlier company unions were far less collaborative than
modern work groups. See id. at 860-61, 875-79.
163. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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may make organizing more difficult in some circumstances, but much
of that difficulty would arise from workers being satisfied with the
level of input they enjoy via their employer-sponsored work group. It
is up to the union to convince employees that traditional unionism
would be better. Thus, in addition to providing more employee voice,
encouraging work groups would spur competition and innovation by
traditional unions and give employees a taste of collective representation—possibly resulting in a higher level of union density. 164 Indeed, the company union prohibition under the Railway Labor Act 165
(RLA) is narrower than the NLRB’s, yet union density is significantly
higher in industries covered by the RLA. 166 The goal, however, should
not be purely to bolster traditional unionism. What is more important is that competition and complementarity between union and
nonunion vehicles of worker voice are likely to pull traditional unions in a direction aimed more at value creation and less at rent
appropriation.
Most workforces will remain nonunion in the current economic
environment. The choice, then, is between the status quo or more
nonunion workplaces with enhanced employee input. As evidenced by
164. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1544 (arguing that allowing employer work groups
might spur innovation among unions); Rafael Gomez & Morley Gunderson, The Experience
Good Model of Trade Union Membership, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS, supra note
77, at 92, 92, 102-08 (arguing that union membership is an “experience good”—a good or
service “whose attributes and quality are hard to discern prior to purchase” or exposure);
Hyde, supra note 101, at 160 (arguing that work groups might lead to unionization and
may allow some form of union representation in workplaces where there is not majority
support for the union); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1702, 1710-11 (noting Canadian example
of a work group transforming into a traditional union and a similar transformation in the
U.S. at AT&T); Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to
Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 681-88 (2006) (arguing that increased competition among unions will result in increased union membership).
165. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000).
166. The RLA states that representatives “shall be designated by the respective parties
without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives.” Id. § 152 (Third). Also, “it shall be unlawful
for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the
funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization,
labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining.” Id. § 152 (Fourth). The RLA
defines representative as “any person or persons, labor union, organization, or corporation
designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act for it
or them.” Id. § 151 (Sixth). This suggests that the RLA’s company union prohibition, unlike
section 8(a)(2), extends only to organizations that act in a representational role in collective bargaining activities. See Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation: A
Legal/Policy Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 101, at
196, app. 1 at 215. Although not attributable—at least not to any significant degree—to
differences in the NLRA’s and RLA’s company union prohibitions, the union density in industries covered by the RLA is much higher than the current overall private sector rate of
under 8%. For example, in 2006 the union density in the air transportation industry was
49.3% and in the rail transportation industry union density was 70.9%. See Union Membership and Coverage Database, Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment
by Industry (2006), http://unionstats.com (follow hyperlink listed under “Index of Tables”).
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the Dunlop Commission report and subsequent literature, many employees say they want such input. 167 The highly competitive environment in which U.S. firms operate will provide both an incentive to
develop welfare-enhancing innovations in workplace governance and
a constraint on developments that transfer rents but do not add
value. If welfare-enhancing innovations develop, adoption could be
widespread; if not, there will be little change. Whatever the eventual
effects, initial employer response is likely to be limited. Despite management protestations, the extent to which current law provides an
overwhelming barrier to nonunion work groups is unclear, 168 and
their use may be limited to a significant degree by management reluctance to increase worker participation. 169 Relaxation of the current
restrictions would be a change in the right direction, however, encouraging and publicly sanctioning participation and cooperation in
nonunion companies. 170
B. Changing the Labor Law Default
A particularly broad reform that could prompt far greater development of nontraditional work groups than modifications to the company union ban would be to change the labor law default from its
current nonunion setting. One alternative default would be a governance structure with some level of independent worker voice that does
not rise to the level of formal collective bargaining—perhaps similar
to Germany’s works councils. 171 This default could be waived or re-

167. See supra notes 62-66.
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. But see Kaufman, supra note 122, at
753, 777-78 (describing interviews with managers who sought to avoid the cost and embarrassment of section 8(a)(2) litigation or to avoid giving a union grounds to file an unfair labor practice charge).
169. It would take further change in employers’ view of the role of employees to significantly increase the use of such groups. Employers in the U.S. are seeking more employee
input then they did decades ago but have yet to completely buy into the idea of employees
as true partners in the enterprise. See Summers, supra note 120, at 136 (noting that
American employers have emulated Japan’s quality circles but have resisted allowing employee voice in more substantial decisions). That said, the use of such groups is growing,
and fewer restrictions would likely further that trend. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note
21, at 172-73 (reporting survey results showing that many managers favor some employee
involvement); Kaufman, supra note 122, at 753, 804-06 (noting growth in the U.S. and far
greater use of such groups in Canada).
170. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1548-49 (discussing effects of section 8(a)(2) on
work groups).
171. Other commentators have discussed changing the default. See Barenberg, supra
note 77, at 959-61 (discussing making unionization the default); cf. WEILER, supra note 8,
at 228-32 (discussing the hurdles to unionization caused by the current default); Estlund,
supra note 2, at 1594-95 (discussing some difficulties resulting from the “non-union baseline” rule that no union exists until a majority of employees organize); Cass R. Sunstein,
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 256-57 (2001) (noting that the
nonunion “default rule represents a choice among a range of options” and that “any such
rule has to be defended against reasonable alternatives”).
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placed with the express approval of employees and management. 172
As is the case for German works councils, one may want to require
that the voice mechanism be activated only in those establishments where it is requested by employees, while also exempting
very small establishments. 173
At first blush, one might think that changing the default would
have little effect. Labor law’s current nonunion default allows a majority of workers to either choose union representation or subsequently decertify a union. 174 If union representation were the default,
a majority of workers could similarly decertify the union as their
agent or subsequently elect a union. This raises the question
whether, in a frictionless system, employee preferences would be unaffected by the initial default and thus lead to the same low level of
private sector union coverage seen today. The answer is no. The labor
law default has a significant effect on the resulting governance structure, even when a low cost procedure to move away from the default
exists. Shifting to a union default, for example, would lead to widespread union decertification but not to a steady-state private sector
density as low as the current 7.4%.175
The default’s importance results from several factors. One reason
is that the NLRA certification and decertification process is far from
frictionless. 176 More important is that economic agents exhibit behavioral inertia, often sticking with an existing rule or environment as
long as it does not differ too much from the preferred choice. 177 The
default also acts as a signal that the state or employer has deemed
the default as an appropriate norm. 178 Further, as businesses engage
in normal turnover, there is a tendency to move toward the default;
currently, older businesses, including some that are unionized, are
replaced by new businesses, which almost always begin as nonunion. 179 Many workplaces, therefore, will not change from the default
governance structure. Yet, despite these factors, changing the default
172. Workable standards for determining whether an agreement to move from the default has been reached could include an election among workers or the type of unmistakable evidence required to find that a union has waived its right to bargain over a certain
issue. See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (holding that a valid
waiver must be “ ‘explicitly stated’ ” and “clear and unmistakable” (quoting Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956))).
173. If the new labor law default is deemed by employers to be costly, one would see
a spike in the number of small establishments holding employment to just below the
coverage level.
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000).
175. See supra note 16 (noting that in 2006, the union density was only 7.4%).
176. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 933 (discussing costs of organizing and other
types of collective action); WEILER, supra note 8, at 114-15.
177. See Sunstein, supra note 171, at 220-24.
178. See id. at 225-26.
179. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 932-33.
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rule will not act as a mandate. Rather, the default is a starting
point—or bargaining “threat point”—from which the parties would
remain free to move given mutual agreement.
We see virtue in a default that establishes some form of independent work group, although not one with full collective bargaining
rights. Workers would retain their current right to form independent
unions without management approval. The default mechanism would
specify standard procedures through which these independent work
groups and management might discuss, negotiate, and approve mutually beneficial changes. It is difficult to predict precisely how any
given system might evolve and operate, and the default will not function well in all workplaces. We suspect that in many, if not most,
workplaces, employees would not invoke their right to engage in collective voice. In other workplaces, the employer and workers would
have incentive to move away from the default and develop proposals
for participatory welfare-enhancing governance structures, whether
in the form of unions or less formal work groups. Over time, experience with such a system will lead to administrative and legislated
changes in the default.
The inability to identify in advance all outcomes of a given reform
is not a fatal flaw. The same can be said of any change, including the
NLRA’s enactment in 1935. Moreover, laws and regulations evolve in
response to changing benefits and costs. Adoption of a new workplace
default would set off significant activity among management, workers, and workers’ agents to communicate, negotiate, and arrive at alternatives that make the parties better off.
Such a major change in labor law obviously requires thorough
analysis and careful design. The actual working of such a system,
however, would be determined in no small part by the way it
evolves in the workplace, courts, and regulatory agencies. Given
the current stagnation in the NLRA’s governance of the changing
workplace, a fundamental change such as shifting the default
could provide a useful catalyst for important modifications and refinements of labor regulation. 180

180. One concern in shifting the default toward collective voice is that such a change
might transfer too much power to incumbent workers, leading to labor cost levels inconsistent with full employment. It may prove difficult to limit the ability of work groups to appropriate rents within a framework that promotes voice and the evolution of welfareenhancing arrangements. See Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic
Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27, 29, 49-50 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck
eds., 1995).
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C. Conditional Deregulation
Another means to encourage the development of certain types of
work groups is a reform along the lines of David Levine’s proposed
“conditional deregulation.” 181 Under this proposal, a subset of governmental regulations would be waived if there is consent by both
the company and an approved worker organization within the company. 182 Levine recognizes that there are a large number of governmental mandates and regulatory measures regarding workplace
safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, discrimination,
family leave, and other subjects, but he argues that “one-size-fits-all”
rules are often inefficient. 183 Instead, he contends, employee involvement in enforcing these rules could significantly lower the cost of
workplace regulation. 184 In the process of improving workplace regulations, Levine’s proposal is likely to expand welfare-enhancing
worker voice and participation.
Under the Levine proposal, the default for nearly all firms would
be the status quo—coverage by the full extent of regulations. These
regulations would be divided into waivable and nonwaivable rules—
with the latter including a minimum set of standards, such as those
dealing with discrimination or safety, required of all employers. 185
Conditional deregulation would exempt employers from the waivable
set of regulations and subject them only to the minimum standards if
they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with employee oversight and approval. 186 The expectation is that this form
of conditional deregulation would be welfare-enhancing for both
workers and employers.
In order to deregulate workplace standards, firms must have in
place independent worker committees to perform the approval and
oversight functions. The union and employer would provide such authority within unionized companies. 187 For larger nonunion employers, worker committees created via a certified free election process
would have authority to approve the waiver on behalf of employees. 188 Conditional deregulation would thus spur the establishment of
worker associations throughout the private sector, providing a vehicle for nonunion worker participation and cooperation. Such groups
181. David Levine, They Should Solve Their Own Problems: Reinventing Workplace
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 475, 477
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 477-79.
184. Id. at 480.
185. Id. at 478, 483-84.
186. Id. at 483-84, 493.
187. Id. at 478.
188. See id. As Levine notes, this is similar to the experience in many European countries, where work councils often oversee workplace safety. Id.; see also supra notes 127-30.

1170

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1133

might also be used as an instrument to transfer quasi-rents from
shareholders to workers. 189 But rent seeking should be limited given
that employers can determine whether or not to stick with the default regulatory standard. Therefore, although the details of any such
plan are important, conditional deregulation offers an opportunity to
foster nonunion voice and provide mutual gains to workers and employers in at least some workplaces. In practice, it is possible that
few establishments would opt out of the current regulatory regime. If
nothing else, this would provide evidence that the costs of current
regulations are not nearly so great as some critics allege.
D. State and Local Labor Regulation
A change in the national labor law default or conditional deregulation requires strong public and legislative support, neither of which
looks likely to occur imminently. Richard Freeman and others have
suggested that a more promising source for labor regulation reform—
possibly including reforms that would encourage welfare-enhancing
employee voice—is state legislation. 190 The theory is that states’ successes and failures in implementing workplace regulations would be
imitated and avoided, respectively, by other states. Thus, to the extent that states have latitude to enact labor regulations, it is possible
that state capitals may become the focal point for political action. 191
Indeed, counties and municipalities already are often at the forefront
of laws affecting the workplace, including sexual orientation antidiscrimination measures and living wage ordinances. 192
Significant limits to the state and local model exist, however. The
broad scope of NLRA preemption means that many major innovations in labor regulation would be permissible only at the federal
level. 193 Accordingly, federal labor preemption must drastically
189. See supra note 40.
190. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations
Law?, 58 PROCS. LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 125 (2006) (arguing in favor of
state regulation of labor relations).
191. See Minimum Wage Was ‘Hot Button’ Issue in State Labor Laws Enacted in 2005,
DAILY LABOR REP., Feb. 2, 2006, at A-1 (reporting that states enacted more labor and employment legislation in 2005 than usual).
192. See Indianapolis Adds Protections for Gays, Lesbians, DAILY LABOR REP., Jan. 6,
2006, at A-11 (reporting that Marion County, Indiana, and the city of Indianapolis enacted
legislation prohibiting workplace sexual orientation discrimination); Susan J. McGolrick,
Professor Examines Living Wage Law Growth in Comments to New York Labor Law Forum, DAILY LABOR REP., May 26, 2004, at C-1 (stating that over 110 state and local living
wage laws existed as of early 2004 and over seventy campaigns for such laws in other localities were taking place).
193. The federal preemption barrier is recognized by Freeman. See Freeman, supra
note 190; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959)
(holding that NLRA generally preempts state action involving (1) conduct that NLRA
clearly protects or prohibits or (2) conduct that NLRA arguably protects or prohibits where
there is danger to national labor policy in allowing state, rather than NLRB, to examine is-
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change for any significant state or local innovations in workplace
governance to occur. Because labor preemption is primarily a creation of the Supreme Court—based on its interpretation of congressional intent—such a modification is theoretically possible without
legislation. 194 Yet, the Court’s preemption jurisprudence began in
earnest almost fifty years ago and is unlikely to suddenly shift absent
legislative action.
The cost of federal preemption is that it forecloses what might
otherwise be beneficial state labor and employment law innovations.
Were federal preemption relaxed, governance innovations adopted in
large states would frequently lead national firms to implement them
company-wide. Moreover, if innovations in states of any size were
viewed as welfare-enhancing, other states would be more likely to
copy them; governance innovations that are costly to firms or appear
to provide few benefits to workers are least likely to be adopted. 195
Some variation in state employment regulation should also be welfare-enhancing by allowing legal heterogeneity that reflects differences in the preferences of voters, in states’ economic environments,
and in the legitimate influence of interest groups.
Federal labor preemption, however, provides the obvious benefit
of enabling employers with establishments in more than one state to
operate under the same legal regime. 196 Variations in state regulations may produce other negative effects as well. For example, politicians in some states may be overly sensitive to business interests and
the location of new plants, thereby adopting labor and employment
laws that may not be welfare-enhancing. 197 Politicians in other states
may produce a set of labor and employment laws that are overly

sue); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-51 (1976) (upholding dormant preemption that precludes
state regulation where NLRA intends parties to freely engage in economic conflict); Estlund, supra note 2, 1569-79 (describing preemption and arguing for allowing more state
and local labor regulation). Interestingly, unions often face a much greater risk of entanglement with state law, as the preemption doctrine has increasingly allowed state liability
for union conduct that is alleged to have violated state tort law. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 891, 935-40 (2006);
Getman, supra note 124, at 132 (citing libel, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and strike violence as claims against a union which could be dealt with under
state law).
194. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 155; Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240.
195. For example, several states require employer-sponsored safety committees, which
in at least one state appears to have significantly lowered the cost of workplace injuries.
See Levine, supra note 181, at 481.
196. See, e.g., Erik Schelzig, FedEx’s Smith Warns of Regulating, MEMPHIS
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug. 16, 2006, at C2 (quoting FedEx chairman’s warning to the national conference of state legislatures that additional state regulation can drive business
away because “commerce today is not local in virtually any respect”).
197. This is a variant of the argument that states will engage in a “race to the bottom.”
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beneficial to incumbent workers, which may discourage new plants
and job growth.
In the end, the attractiveness of greater state and local flexibility
depends on numerous factors that are difficult to assess. Heterogeneity in states’ and localities’ underlying preferences and economic environments makes heterogeneity in the law more attractive. Lack of
uniformity in the law has a cost, however, particularly in a dynamic
economy with considerable interstate (and international) commerce.
Legal experimentation and innovation can provide many of the same
benefits as does competition in the private economy. But the link is
not nearly so clear-cut. Many reasonable persons will prefer to put all
their eggs in a single basket of federal labor regulation than in the
many baskets of various state labor laws. A more nuanced analysis,
one beyond the scope of this Article, would identify the specific forms
of labor and employment regulation that might best operate at the
federal level and those for which state and local heterogeneity would
be most beneficial.
Regardless of one’s view of the attractiveness of state and local
innovation in workplace governance, a move in that direction faces
considerable political, legal, and economic barriers. 198 Accordingly, we
believe that greater state and local labor regulation may expand
welfare-enhancing worker voice and participation in certain geographic areas, but is not a particularly promising avenue for the
country as a whole. 199
E. The Internet
The promotion of employee voice and participation also requires
labor regulations that ensure employees’ freedom to use electronic
communications to converse with each other about workplace concerns. E-mail, weblogs, and websites, which we refer to simply as the
“Internet,” have sharply lowered communication costs and are changing the way in which people interact. This change is highly significant for the workplace, as the Internet has become a vital tool for a
wide variety of entities such as unions, companies, employees, work
groups, and policy advocates. Employees’ use of the Internet at
work—from communications made while at the worksite to work
done exclusively as a telecommuter—has continued to grow drastically. In the October 2003 supplement to the Current Population
Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated that 55.5% of
all employees used a computer at work and that 41.7% used the
198. To varying degrees, the same might be said for other reforms analyzed in this Article.
199. The appeal of state labor reform to Freeman and other scholars may stem less
from their optimism about the promise of state reforms than from pessimism regarding the
possibility or direction of federal reforms.
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Internet, although computer use varies substantially with respect to
occupation, industry, and education. 200 The Board, even as early as
1993, recognized that at some worksites, e-mail had “become an important, if not essential, means of communication.” 201 That description is far more apt today.
The low cost of electronic communications has made it particularly valuable to unions and other groups attempting to organize employees, as they provide an affordable means to reach many employees, especially at small and widely dispersed job sites. 202 However,
given the low rate of private sector unionism, most employees’ use of
the Internet for collective action takes place in firms that are nonunion. The Internet provides nonunion firms interested in promoting
employee voice and cooperation an additional, low-cost means of
communicating with their employees. Use of the Internet is not without legal risk, however. Although to a far lesser extent than Internet
usage by outside organizers or work groups, 203 employees’ freedom to
use electronic communications to discuss work issues among themselves or with their employer faces possible hurdles under the NLRA.
A threshold issue involving employee Internet use is the extent to
which electronic communications are treated as concerted activity

200. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND
INTERNET
USE
AT
WORK
IN
2003
2
tbl.A
(2005),
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ciuaw.pdf; see also Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy Mansfield, On the Increasing Presence of Remote Employees: An Analysis of the Internet’s Impact
on Employment Law as It Relates to Teleworkers, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 233, 23435 (discussing rise in teleworkers). E-mail is not the only popular form of electronic communication for employees; one survey found that 35% of employees used instant messaging
at work. See Survey Finds More Employer Policies Focus on Employees’ Email than IM,
Blogs, DAILY LABOR REP., July 18, 2006, at A-8.
201. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993).
202. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 17 (2006) (describing employee organizing drive started by downloading information from union website and distributing it to
other employees); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 10-11 (2005)
(finding that employer unlawfully terminated employee who, among other union activities,
created a Yahoo! webpage to encourage discussions among employees during organizing
campaign), enforced, 181 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2006); Freeman, supra note 79, at 2, 10-11
(noting that “all international federations and thousands of local unions [have] developed
websites” and describing AFL-CIO’s “Working Families Network,” which has over two million e-mail addresses of union “eActivists”).
203. Nonemployee organizers’ ability to use an employers’ Internet system raises several important issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on maximizing employee voice and workplace cooperation in an economy where the dominant form of
workplace governance is based on nonunion, managerial discretion. These issues include
whether organizers’ unauthorized use of an employer’s electronic communications system
is treated the same as organizers’ unauthorized activity on an employer’s real property.
See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1992) (holding that employer can exclude organizers from its property in a nondiscriminatory manner if reasonable alternatives to contacting employees exist); Hirsch, supra note 193, 899-905, 916-43 (discussing
Lechmere and proposing new Board analysis for nonemployee right to access cases).
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that is protected by the NLRA. 204 The question is important given
that, in many workplaces, a significant amount of employee interactions occur electronically. 205 Even where these interactions involve
discussions and cooperation with an employer, employees must have
the freedom to talk among themselves without fear of employer interference. Indeed, whatever value may inure to the employer or employees from enhanced employee voice is dependent on a free flow of
information. If employees fear that their comments, suggestions, or
requests will result in adverse employment actions, they are unlikely
to participate in meaningful workplace communications. Having an
independent third party—the NLRB—guarantee and protect employees’ right to communicate without undue employer interference could
be an important safeguard that helps to foster workplace participation.
The potential for employers to react negatively to employee comments is not far-fetched. Lower-level supervisors and managers, in
particular, may be more concerned with their personal interests than
that of the firm as a whole. 206 Yet, the performance of these supervisors and managers is likely to be an important piece of information
that employees possess and employers want. 207 It is exactly this type
of knowledge that can provide significant benefits for workplace cooperation programs—but only if employees believe that they can provide the information without suffering adverse actions. The NLRA is
well-suited to safeguard employees in such situations. 208
Section 7 of the NLRA protects most employee activity that is
concerted—that is, activity that seeks to promote or protect employees’ collective workplace interests. 209 Thus, an employer generally
204. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248-50 (1997) (concluding that employee’s e-mail criticism of vacation benefits was protected under the Act); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours, 311 N.L.R.B. at 897 (finding that employer unlawfully barred union literature
from company e-mail system); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 49-50 (2000) (discussing the Timekeeping and E.I. du Pont de Nemours cases).
205. See supra note 200; Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights: The NLRA and
Employee Electronic Communications, 105 Yale L.J. 1639, 1657 (1996).
206. See Hirsch, supra note 49, at 984-85 & n.186 (noting managerial interests, such as
salary and job security, that may create a disparity between managers’ interests and the
firm’s interests).
207. See id. at 971-73 (discussing possibility that employees’ increased participation in
employee stock ownership plans may lead to better monitoring of work).
208. One private source for this safeguarding role is the Anonymous Employee
website, which provides a means for employees who fear retaliation to inform, and
possibly engage in a dialogue with, their employer about workplace problems while
maintaining their anonymity. See Anonymous Employee, How Does It Work?,
http://www.anonymousemployee.com/csssite/sidelinks/how.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
209. Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Those rights are enforced through section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for
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may not engage in any activity that reasonably tends to make employees feel that their right to engage in concerted activity is chilled.
Typically, Internet usage is considered the same as any other traditional, concerted and protected communication. 210 This approach
makes sense, for the means of communication has little or no effect
on whether an activity is considered concerted and protected under
section 7. The Internet merely serves as a resource to engage in this
type of activity, and the Board appropriately treats it as such.211
Because a section 8(a)(1) violation requires only a “reasonable
tendency” to interfere with employees’ freedom to engage in protected
activity, no matter the motive, 212 employers must ensure that they do
not retaliate, even unintentionally, against employees’ electronic
communications. An employer that encourages employee participation should make clear to employees that they are generally free to
communicate with each other and with the employer without facing
negative consequences. Punishing an employee for even a highly
critical e-mail would not only chill employees’ willingness to fully

an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their section 7] rights.” Id. § 158(a)(1). An employer violates section 8(a)(1) even when its “conduct
tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in” the exercise of their section 7
rights; evidence of animus or actual coercion is unnecessary. See Retlaw Broad. Co. v.
NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 7 protects
collective activity even where no formal organization is involved. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-16 (1962) (holding that employees involved in walkout were
protected even though not part of organized group).
210. See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-48 (1997) (finding that
employee’s e-mail to other employees was concerted and protected activity that was “for
the ‘purpose of [. . .] mutual aid or protection’ ” because the e-mail criticized the employer’s
proposed vacation policy and implicitly attempted to elicit support from others employees
to oppose the proposal (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157)). A further problem that may result from
increased use of electronic communications involves employees who do not work at the
primary worksite, such as telecommuters. Under the Board’s long-standing test for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the Board considers factors including the hiring party’s right to control the work, the location of the work,
and “ ‘the hiring party’s discretion over when and how to work.’ ” St. Joseph News-Press,
345 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 7 (2005) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 750-52 (1989)). Unless the Board adapts its test to reflect technological changes that
make telecommuting more common and employers better able to maintain control over
telecommuters, those workers are more likely to be considered independent contractors
and excluded from the protection of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (exempting
independent contractors from NLRA definition of employee). Without the protection of the
NLRA, telecommuters will be less likely to participate in a workplace cooperative program
if they fear the possibility that their employer will retaliate against their contributions to
the program.
211. A problem, however, is that many nonunion employees may not realize that their
concerted activity is protected by the NLRA. Hyde, supra note 76, at 507 (noting that nonunion employee activity often fails to garner the respect and protection of unionized conduct, perhaps in part because nonunion action does not fit the stereotype of NLRAprotected conduct).
212. See Retlaw Broad., 53 F.3d at 1006.
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participate in workplace discussions but likely violate section 8(a)(1)
as well. 213
Yet employees must also be wary. Complications exist when, as is
common, employees use employer-provided Internet services. 214 An
employer’s interests in the operation of its Internet system may alter
the typical section 7 balancing test between employee rights and employer interests, and that shift may be dispositive in determining
whether employee activity on an employer’s system is protected. 215
Under this balancing test, an employee’s concerted and otherwise
protected action will lose section 7 protection if it unreasonably interferes with the employer’s business interests. For example, in Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc., 216 the Board found that a nonunion
employee’s e-mail critical of its employer was not protected by the
NLRA because it automatically appeared on all computers and required a user to delete the message to remove it from the screen. 217
According to the Board, this e-mail interrupted employees’ work during a busy time and took over the system as medical information was
being entered. 218 Although a similar message that lacked such an effect would generally be protected, 219 the Board will likely continue to
213. See Timekeeping, 323 N.L.R.B. at 247-48.
214. See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming February 2008), manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957606.
215. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269
(1965) (holding that “it is only when the interference with [section] 7 rights outweighs the
business justification for the employer’s action that [section] 8(a)(1) is violated”). Given this
Article’s focus on employer-initiated workplace cooperation schemes, we do not address
problems involving employer attempts to broadly restrict employees’ use of the Internet or
e-mail, which implicates the Republic Aviation line of cases. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945) (citing Le Tourneau Co. of Ga, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 125960 (1944) (holding that, with some exceptions, employers cannot prohibit discussions
among employees about concerted and protected topics during non-work time)); see, e.g., In
re Guard Pub. Co. (Register-Guard), Nos. 36-CA-8743-1 et al., 2002 WL 336963 (N.L.R.B.
Div. Judges Feb. 21, 2002) (finding by ALJ that the employer could lawfully maintain a
nondiscriminatory rule banning all non-work-related solicitations, including messages
about unionization, from its Internet system); Press Release, NLRB, NLRB to Hold Oral
Argument on Employee Use of Employer’s E-Mail System (Jan. 10, 2007) (noting that
the
full,
five-member
Board
will
consider
the
case),
available
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2006/R-2613.pdf; see also Adrantz,
ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000) (finding that employer’s broad ban against all non-work e-mails was not an unfair labor practice because
the rule was not regularly enforced against personal e-mails and there was no evidence of
it being discriminately applied to prohibit union discussions via e-mail), vacated in part on
other grounds, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Instead, where an employer authorizes
some employee use of its electronic communication system, the greater threat is retaliation against specific messages and the chilling effect of surveillance and monitoring of those communications.
216. 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988) (finding that employer did not unlawfully fire employee).
217. Id. at 98, 103.
218. Id. at 103.
219. See, e.g., Timekeeping, 323 N.L.R.B. at 249 (expressly distinguishing Washington
Adventist and finding that use of employer’s e-mail system to send messages criticizing
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find that e-mails causing disruptions to the extent of what occurred
in Washington Adventist are excessive. The result is that employees
must be careful in how they use their employer’s Internet system.
Another issue centers on whether employer’s surveillance of employees’ electronic communications—or the creation of an impression
of such surveillance—may unlawfully chill employees’ ability to engage in meaningful discussions with one another about workplace issues. In particular, the monitoring of employees’ Internet use, which
many employers now do as a routine matter, 220 may constitute
unlawful surveillance if some of those communications involve subjects related to protected activity. 221 Employees participating in an
employer-sponsored work group are susceptible to this risk, as they
are likely to be in contact with other employees to discuss their views
on workplace matters. If the employer monitors e-mails, a reasonable
employee is likely to feel hesitant about criticizing her employer or
supervisor. That chilling effect could undermine the value of workplace participation programs and violate the NLRA.
The Board’s well-established surveillance law seeks to minimize
the chilling effect on protected conduct by reducing the risk that employees believe that their employer is taking special efforts to monitor their collective activity. 222 Thus, absent sufficient justification, an
employer violates the NLRA by observing employees engaged in
protected activity or making an impression that they are engaging

employer’s vacation policy proposal was protected activity); Malin & Perritt, supra note
204, at 57 (arguing that employer should have to prove an actual, significant disruption before barring employee e-mail solicitations).
220. One 2005 survey found that 76% of employers monitored the Internet use of at
least some of its employees. See Study Finds 76 Percent of Respondents Monitor Usage of
Internet by Employees, DAILY LABOR REP., May 25, 2005, at A-8 (finding also that 62% of
employers monitor Internet use of all of their employees).
221. Moreover, attempts to use an employer-controlled system without authorization
risks violating the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). See 18 U.S.C.
§2701 (2000). In the ECPA, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act, which
makes it a crime to “intentionally access[ ] without authorization a facility through which
an electronic communication service is provided . . . and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” Id. §
2701(a); see also id. § 2701(c)(2) (exempting conduct authorized by user of service); Konop
v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the district
court’s grant for summary judgment because employer’s access to employee’s restrictedaccess site may violate Stored Communications Act). The ECPA, however, contains an exception in certain instances for employer monitoring of workplace communications. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (monitoring employer’s own service); Malin & Perritt, supra
note 204, at 38-40 (citing exceptions).
222. See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that photographing or videotaping protected activity has tendency to intimidate employees); Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that, although surveillance is not per se unlawful, it has “natural, if not presumptive, tendency to discourage [union] activity”).
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in such observations. 223 Sufficient justification for surveillance exists where an employer can show the existence of a reasonable
threat of violence or other misconduct that would affect the employer’s business. 224
The key issue regarding an employer’s monitoring of electronic
communications is whether a sufficient business justification exists.
This inquiry should depend on whether the employer’s monitoring
resembles a program that (1) merely screens electronic communications for certain words or other indications of improper usage (for example, pornography) or (2) regularly reports the content of communications or the identities of employees using the Internet. Both circumstances could reasonably lead employees to believe that the employer is monitoring their protected discussions. The latter example,
however, has a far weaker business justification, thereby failing to
defend the employer’s surveillance and increasing the interference
with employees’ ability to communicate with each other without fear
of retaliation. In short, an employer should have few problems if it
does not attempt to monitor specific communications related to protected activity and does not generally monitor the substance of Internet activity. Employers, however, must be careful not to make their
observations too broad or specific.
Regardless of the NLRB’s approach to the issues of protection and
surveillance of electronic communications, the Internet will continue
to play a large role in the workplace. The NLRA, however, will have
an impact on the Internet’s ability to foster collective action. That
impact will be most significant with regard to outside groups’ ability

223. See Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F. App’x 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2002)
(watching employees take handbills); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d
Cir. 1982) (rejecting the proposition that surveillance alone constitutes a presumptive violation of the NLRA); Ingram Book Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 515, 518 (1994) (finding unlawful surveillance of union meeting because company vice president did not state credible reason for
driving past meeting spot twice and employer was hostile toward union activities). An impression of surveillance violation occurs where, “under all the relevant circumstances, reasonable employees would assume from [the employer’s action or statement] that their union or other protected activities had been placed under surveillance.” Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 9 (2005) (citing Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257
(1993); Schrementi Bros., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 853 (1969)), enforced, 181 Fed. App’x 85 (2d
Cir. 2006). An impression of surveillance finding does not require that employees attempted to keep their activity secret or that the employer used unlawful means to obtain
knowledge of the employees’ activity. Id. at 9 n.19 (citing United Charter Serv., Inc., 306
N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1992)).
224. See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (holding that “reasonable, objective justification”—such as legitimate security interests, gathering evidence for legal proceeding, or
reasonable anticipation of misconduct—will mitigate tendency to coerce). Explaining to
employees why the surveillance is necessary will be an important part of this justification.
Cf. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403-04 (2001) (concluding that employer
must clarify for employees a facially overbroad no-distribution rule to rebut presumption of unlawfulness).
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to contact workers in the face of employer resistance, 225 but the
NLRA does have some relevance to employer-sponsored worker participation programs. To be sure, employers that are willing to encourage worker voice are less likely to interfere with employees’ freedom to exercise that voice. Nevertheless, the NLRA can protect employees’ freedom to use electronic communications while participating in employer-sponsored cooperation programs. This protection will
encourage employee voice and cooperation that is more honest and
representative of other employees’ interest, which will in turn make
workplace participation programs more useful.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past seventy years, the NLRA has played an important
role in the development of private sector unionization. The NLRA’s
current role has become marginalized, however, largely failing to effectively serve either the small private union sector or the large nonunion sector. This failure is most pronounced with regard to the demand for, and potential gains from, greater workplace voice and cooperation in many nonunion workplaces. To the extent that mutual
employer and worker gains are to be realized, they will occur largely
through nonmandated employer workplace norms in nonunion establishments. Accordingly, the NLRA should foster the development of
employee voice in the nonunion sector; however, the statute more
frequently acts as a hurdle than a spur to welfare-enhancing workplace communications and cooperation.
We have suggested labor and employment law reforms that might
facilitate the development of greater voice and cooperation in the
nonunion private sector while providing the impetus for unions to
create joint value and flourish in an increasingly competitive world.
Specifically, we suggest weakening the NLRA’s company union prohibition in a manner that would permit more employer-supported
work groups, as they will often serve as the best option for employee
voice in the largely nonunion private sector. Other possible reforms
include changing the nonunion labor law default, allowing for conditional deregulation that encourages the development of independent
workers councils as a substitute for governmental mandates, and
greater experimentation and competition in state and local labor
regulations. Finally, labor law should recognize the lower costs of
communication and coordination associated with the Internet, encouraging its use to enhance workplace voice and participation.
The most likely prospect for the near future is the absence of significant policy innovations. With or without major changes, however,
225. See supra note 203.
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evolutionary transformation in the workplace will continue as economic agents react to changing opportunities and constraints. Rather
than relying on a labor law regime designed for a different era or increasing the use of federal one-size-fits-all labor regulations, a better
way exists. Employment and labor law reforms that encourage and
facilitate the evolution and development of nonunion workplace voice
and cooperation can best satisfy the diverse needs of workers, employers, and society in the modern economy.

